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INTRODUCTION
In 19^1* for the second time in the twentieth oon- 
tury, much of the world was at war. Once again, it was a 
struggle of life and death, a fight for survival of demo­
cracy directed against a dictatorial aggressor, Germany.
In World War I, it had been the aim of the United States as 
expressed by President T. Woodrow Wilson ”to make the world 
safe for democracy.” This failed. During World War II, 
the United Nations fought for a similar goal, attempting to 
assure a better outcome by means of conferences in which 
they set forth their aims. The disastrous results of the 
Paris Peace Settlement had taught a lesson. It was thought 
that definite plans for postwar actions had to be agreed 
upon prior to the end of the fighting, if chaos was to be 
avoided and a reasonably stable future assured. Thus, to 
achieve the highly Idealistic goal of a democratic world, 
it was determined to deal with postwar planning in a real­
istic manner at a series of Allied conferences.
In the subsequent Allied conferences, realism would 
again conflict with idealism. If the Western Allies alone 
could have negotiated, the outcome might have been promis­
ing for a workable solution. To coordinate their plans,
1
2the Big Three had to find a common denominator for their 
discussions. The military task provided sufficient cohe­
siveness to bind the three together; yet* they neglected 
their different past. The Soviet Union was heir to the an­
cient Eastern cultures of the Assyrians and the Persians; 
the United States and Great Britain represented the old 
Western culture which had originated in Greece* Traditions, 
customs and philosophies were different.
When the Big Three were joined by Prance after the 
end of the war, the Four Powers were still separated by 
their ideologies, governments, methods of striving for a 
goal, and, most important, in their policies. This was a 
decisive barrier between them. To administer Germany ac­
cording to the Pour Power arrangements, agreed upon in the 
Allied conferences, required a similar approach from all 
parties involved. Since this commonality was lacking, Ger­
many fell victim to the inter-Allied discord.
Berlin, as an embattled city between the Eastern 
and the Western forms of civilization, became the symbol of 
differing and changing ideas. The flhot war1 that had been 
fought at Marathon, broke out anew in the form of a 1 cold 
war1 in Berlin. The facade of accord errected at the Allied 
conferences crumbled and became manifested by the Berlin 
blockade, which.once again divided the world along ancient 
political lines.
CHAPTER I




From the very outset of World War II, the United 
States, though officially neutral, had assumed a rather ben­
evolent attitude toward countries at war with Germany. This 
was manifested in the help extended to Great Britain under 
the cash-and-carry program and later through lend-lease ar­
rangements.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt skillfully steered 
the nation toward the day when the United States actively 
entered the war as a belligerent for the western cause.^ By 
August, 1941, his intentions became quite evident. In the 
middle of this month, under the cover of secrecy, the Presi­
dent met with British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill on 
a battleship off the Newfoundland coast to discuss the situ­
ation. The result of their talks was announced to the world
1Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the Ameri­
can People (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1964),' 
pp. 717-718. Hereafter cited as Bailey, A Diplomatic History 
of the American People.
3
k>
2in the form of the Atlantic Charter of August 1^, 19*H.
A week after the Atlantic Charter was signed, Roose­
velt sent a message to Congress, explaining that at the
meeting with Churchill definite plans had been developed to
3
safeguard the world from Hitler1s aggression. The Presi­
dent failed to elaborate on this point. Instead, the mes­
sage included the text of the Atlantic Charter.
The Atlantic Declaration was an expression of common 
ideas rather than a clear statement as to the strategy to be 
pursued in the effort to defeat the Axis powers. The most 
Important points of the Charter read as follows:
“First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, ter­
ritorial or other;
"Second, they desire to see no territorial changes 
that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes 
of the people concerned;
"Third, they respect the right of all peoples to 
choose the form of government under which they will 
live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self- 
government restored to those who have been forcibly 
deprived of them;
“Forth, they will endeavor, with due respect for 
their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment 
of all states, great or small, victor or vanquished, 
of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the 
raw materials of the world which are needed for 
their economic prosperity;
“Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi ty­
ranny, they hope to see established a peace which
2
U.S., Department of State, Peace and War: United 
States Foreign Policy: 1931-19^1, Department of State Publi­
cation No. 1983 (Washington; U.S. Government Printing Of­
fice, 1943), PP. 717-720.
3Ibld.. p. 718.
5will afford to all nations th© means of dwelling in 
safety within their own boundaries, and which will 
afford assurance that all the men in all the lands 
may live out their lives in freedom from fear and 
want? • . .
The President concluded his message to Congress by stating 
that the principles set forth in the Atlantic Charter would 
have to be accepted by all nations, unless they wanted to be 
associated with naziism.
Certainly, the Charter enunciated democratic ideals. 
Although Roosevelt*s closing remarks were somewhat limited, 
it might have been better had he instead referred to totali­
tarian systems in general. At this point, though, he seemed 
well justified; the men in the Kremlin, reading the signs of 
the time, played the tune the West wished to hear. The Sov­
iet union was one of the fifteen anti-Axis nations that had 
endorsed the Atlantic Declaration by September 2A, 19^1.^ 
World reaction differed. The Charter undoubtedly 
stirred hope in the hearts of the people conquered by Ger­
many, encouraging them to resist German aggression by the 
promise of a better future. Thus, the Declaration may have 
served a propaganda purpose. In Great Britain, however, it 
came as an anti-climax to the exciting tension that had de­
veloped when the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting was announced. 
From the first report Englishmen had hoped that the confer-
^Ibld., pp. 718-719. 5Ibld., p. 719.
6Richard B. Morris (ed.), Encyclopedia of American 
History (New Yorks Harper & Bros., 1961)7 P •
6ence would result In the entry of America into the war, and,
thus, a mere enunciation of a set of common principles was a
7
grave disappointment,1
In spite of the inconclusiveness of the Atlantic De­
claration, the importance of other events of 194-1 cannot be 
overestimated. The wartime alliance of Great Britain, the 
Soviet Union, and the United States of America, a reality by 
the end of the year, sprang from two costly blunders of the 
Axis powers during 19*1-1. They were the German decision to 
invade Russia and the Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor.
While the war would continue for'longer than three more 
years, the alliance of the Big Three, as the United Kingdom, 
the U.S.S.R., and the U.S.A. were henceforth labeled, which 
came into being largely because of these actions, was to 
prove more than a match for the conquering German armies and 
the forces of Imperial Japan and their lesser allies.
If peacetime politics make for strange bedfellows, 
then war diplomacy seems to set aside most previously ad­
hered to guidelines for the paramount issue at hand— the de­
feat of the enemy. Only in this light can the help, friend­
ship, and confidence that the United States showered upon 
the Soviet Union be understood. Roosevelt and his staff 
felt quite sure they could cope with the Russian communists. 
Yet, their confidence was somewhat surprising considering
7
H. V. Morton, Atlantic Meeting (London: Methuen & Co. 
Ltd., 19^4), P. 12?.
7that the United States had withheld recognition of the
g
U.S.S.R. for fifteen years. Diplomatic relations were not 
established until 1933? therefore, America lacked crucial, 
extensive knowledge about the formative years of develop­
ment of the Soviet giant.^
Flashbacks The Hltler-Stalln Pact
On August 23, 1939* the world was startled by the 
Hitler-Stalin Pact of non-aggression.10 A week later, World 
War II was triggered off when German troops marched into Po­
land. The correlation between these two events was obvious: 
Two dictators, whose political ideologies were diametrically 
opposed, shrewdly weighing the risks involved, had come to 
the conclusion that they had made a good deal— at least for 
the time being* Both had bought time. Hitler had avoided 
the danger of a two front war; Stalin had gained a vital 
break that enabled him frantically to increase and to speed 
up the Russian armament program. The West had to swallow 
the insult, since both England and France had wooed the So­
viet Union in an effort to make her join them in a military
^David J. Dallin, The Big Three: The United States. 
Britain. Russia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 19^5)» 
p. 251• Hereafter cited as Dallin, The Big Three.
9i m a .
Bruno Gebhardt (ed.), Handbuch der Deutschen Geseh- 
ichte, Vol.IVs Die Zelt der Weltkrlege (8th ed. rev.? 
Stuttgart: Union Verlag, 1959)»PP- 246-2^7* Hereafter cit­
ed as Gebhardt,(ed.), Handbuch der Deutschen Geschlchte,
8entente against Germany.^ As a ruthless though astute 
statesman, Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin had viewed the West­
ern approaches with extreme suspicion. He believed that it 
was the concealed aim of the West to push Russia into war
with Germany in order to divert the impending German attack
12from their own frontiers. Interpreting Western promises
for military aid in this light, he rejected those proposals.
Once the German attack on Russia had become a reality, the
Soviet Union, maneuvering in best Leninist tradition among
13conflicting interests,  ^belatedly Joined the Allies— and 
got all the Western help she needed. By Western standards, 
Stalin's actions were unprincipled, but they served the pur­
pose.
The man in the White House forgave it all. Fifteen 
years of non-recognition were forgotten just as much as Rus­
sia's indirect part in the start of the war, when she sold 
out Poland by signing the Hitler-Stalin Pact. Not all Amer­
icans were so naive, though, in their attitude toward the 
U.S.S.R. Republican Senator Vandenberg continued to dis­
trust the newly acquired ally for the democratic cause. In 
19^ *2, he was already alarmed that America would succumb to
11Ibid.
12Soviet Information Bureau (ed.), Falsifiers of His­
tory (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 19^8)• PP• 
2?-29.
13^David J. Dallin, Russia and Postwar Europe (New Hav­
en: Yale University Press, 1963), pp. 73-7^.
9Soviet wishes. The Issue at hand was the top-secret visit 
of Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov to Washington in 
June of that year. Molotov demanded U.S. declarations of 
war against Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania, satellites of
I2i
Germany, countries which were at war with Russia. Sena­
tor Vandenberg felt that the request was legitimate enough, 
but by like token America could ask for a Russian declara­
tion of war on Japan. Of course, none was forthcoming,^ 
and the American request for airbases in Russia remained 
equally unanswered."^
Very little attention was paid to Senator Vanden- 
berg’s doubts about Soviet trustworthiness and suspicions of 
Russian designs. The minority opinion was swept aside by 
jthe growing crescendo of war. The turning point was 
%19^3* Russians victory in the Battle of Stalingrad turned 
*out to be the beginning of the end. Actions on the various 
battlefrents naturally dominated the minds of the people im­
mediately involved. For the statesmen, however, the time
1/L
Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr. (ed.), The Private Papers 
of Senator Vandenberg (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1952), 
pp. 31-32. Hereafter cited as Vandenberg Papers.
1*5-'Russia finally did declare war on Japan— on August 
9, 19^5» five days after the first atomic bomb fell on Hiro­
shima, in a last minute effort to get in on the spoils of 
the Japanese defeat. For reference to this episode see: 
Harry S. Truman, Memoirs. Vol. I: Year of Decisions (Garden 
City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1955)# P» ^25* 
Hereafter cited as Truman, Year of Decisions.
16Vandenberg Papers, pp. 31-32.
10
for conferences had arrived. While the soldiers had to fin­
ish their jobs, diplomacy took over behind the scene to make 
plans for the postwar world.
The Casablanca Conference;
January 14-24, 19^3
Roosevelt and Churchill met frequently during the 
war to coordinate their plans. The last of their conferen^ 
ces to be dominated by military discussions of strategy was 
held in Casablanca from January 1^ to January 2^, 19^3* If* 
the Casablanca meeting would have been confined to purely 
military talks, its meaning in history would be obscure, to­
day. It was the spectacular joint Roosevelt-Churchill press 
conference that guaranteed Casablanca a distinguished place 
in the annals of the Second World War. For the first time, 
Roosevelt publicly announced his policy of "Unconditional 
Surrender.” In his closing remarks to the press, he said:
Another point. I think we all had it in our 
hearts and heads before, but I don*t think it has 
been put down on paper by the Prime Minister or my­
self, and that is the determination that peace can 
come to the world only by the total elimination of 
German and Japanese war power.
. • . The elimination of German, Japanese, and 
Italian war power means the unconditional surrender 
by Germany, Italy, and Japan.1'
Unconditional Surrender has since become a matter of much
speculation as to the effect on the war. Roosevelt quali-
17'Samuel I. Rosenman (ed.), The Public Papers and Ad­
dresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 19^3 Vol.: The Tide Turns 
(New York:" Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1950), p. 39•
11
fied his statement by going on to say:
* . . it {^Unconditional Surrender] does mean the 
destruction of the philosophies in those countries 
which are bas^d on conquest and the subjugation of 
other people.
This latter part of his announcement would indicate that the 
President talked about the destruction of philosophies, not 
of people, but this qualification was to no avail.
Roosevelt had added fuel to the German propaganda 
machine. German propaganda Minister Dr. Joseph Goebbels 
used Unconditional Surrender as an appeal to the Germans to 
rally behind the government, calling for absolute resistance 
and the total war effort.^ Whether Unconditional Surrender 
prolonged the war or whether Germany would have fought to 
the gruesome end anyway, can be a matter of speculation, on­
ly.
The majority of writers, in an attempt to estimate
the impact of Roosevelt*s unforgetful utterance, wished the
20words would have never crossed his lips. Unconditional 
Surrender was under discussion at Casablanca, but the Presi­
dent and the Prime Minister had reached no conclusion on 
this subject. The communique, issued on January 26, 19^3.
18-TV4 ^Ibid.
^This was confirmed by a letter from Mrs. Liese-Lotte 
Grosse, dated April 10, 1967.
20The writer of this paper did not find a single 
source indicating approval of the enunciation of Undondi- 
tional Surrender.
12
21did not mention the fateful clause.
The State Department Subcommittee on Security Prob­
lems, under the chairmanship of Norman Davis, had toiled
22with the problem of the end of the war. Having been haunt-
23ed by the “dagger legend,“ and in an effort to avoid the 
birth of another myth of this kind, the Subcommittee had re­
commended that:
On the assumption that the victory of the United 
Nations will be conclusive, unconditional surrender 
rather than an armistice should be sought from the 
principal enemy states. . . ^
This recommendation was approved on May 21, 19^2, more than 
six months before the Casablanca announcement. While in 
Casablanca, Churchill cabled the War Cabinet about Roose­
velts suggestion of Unconditional Surrender. The Cabinet
21U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Rela­
tions, A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 
19^1-^9, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1950, Senate Doc. 123* PP. 
£-7“ Hereafter cited as Basic American Documents, 19^1~^9.
22Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War 
They Waged and the Peace They Sought ('Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1957)* P. 108. Hereafter cited 
as Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin.
23^The “dagger legend” sprang up after World War I,
When an armistice was unconditionally accepted by the civil­
ian head of the German delegation, Matthias Erzberger, be­
fore the German armies were actually defeated in the field. 
The Versailles Peace Treaty was the disastrous result. The 
idea developed that the military had been “stabbed in the 
back” by the civilians and that Germany would not have nec­
essarily lost the war. For details see: Gebhardt (ed.), 
Handbuch der Deutschen Geschichte, Vol. IV, pp. 118-119.
2 L
Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, p. 108.
13
2<
did not challenge the idea. J
26The Prime Minister was reportedly appalled when 
the President blurted out his thoughts on this subject, but
he immediately adjusted to the situation and, at least in
27public, supported Roosevelt. ' Privately, to his Foreign
Minister, he confided that he doubted the wisdom of fusing
the Germans f,in a solid desperate block for whom there is no 
28hope.” Churchill further maintained that the announcement
of Unconditional Surrender was probably meant as an act of
29defiance, since the war was not yet won. 7 The victory of
SOStalingrad was gained the following week. Roosevelt him­
self stated later that he had had no intention of mentioning 
Unconditional Surrender until suddenly “the thought popped
Ibid., pp. 110-111. See also Winston S. Churchill, 
The Second World War. Vol. IV: The Hinge of Fate (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), P* 6&6. Hereafter cited as 
Churchill, The Hinge of Fate.
Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, p. 110. See 
also Churchi117 TRe Hinge of'Fate, p. 686.
27(Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Inti­
mate History (New York: Harper & Brothers, 19^8), p. 696. 
Hereafter cited as Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins. See al­
so Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, p. 687♦
28
Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. V: 
Closing the Ring (Boston; Houghton Mifflin Company, 1951)» 
p. 6657 Hereafter cited as Churchill, Closing the Ring.
U.S. Senator Vandenberg shared Churchill1s misgivings. See: 
Vandenberg Papers, p. 91*
29^Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 696.
3°ibia.. p. 695.
1^ '
into . . . [his] mind.“^1 Trying to determine how deeply 
the Presidents poor health affected his actions, is again a 
matter of pure speculation. Harry Hopkins, his closest per­
sonal adviser, noted that Roosevelt suffered from a fevery
cold during the days immediately following the Casablanca 
32Conference.
As is so often the case with a big bureaucratic ma­
chinery, U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull seemed unin­
formed on the subject of Unconditional Surrender, as prepar­
ed by the State Departments Subcommittee on Security Prob­
lems. He shared Churchill*s fears that the statement was 
rather premature, and that it would spur on the Germans to 
endless resistance.-^ Aside of this point, Hull grasped the 
idea that Unconditional Surrender would necessitate an ela­
borate program in order to enable the conquering powers to 
administer the defeated nations down to the lowest local le­
vel. The Secretary felt the Allies were not prepared to 
take the overwhelming obligations that such a program would 
entail.-' It was the purpose of the following conferences 
to work out a plan— providing for Allied unity— that would
*^Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, p. 110.
-^Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 695•
-^Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vol. II, 
(New York: The Macmi1lan~~Company, 19^8), p . 1570. Hereafter 
cited as Hull, Memoirs.
3ifrbid.
15
assure just such measures.
The Moscow Conference of 
Foreign Ministers
The first Big Three meeting of any consequence was
the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers which was held
?
from October 19 to October 30, 19^3* U.S. Secretary of 
State Cordell Hull and British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden 
were the guests of Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov.
The primary subject of discussion was the postwar treatment 
of Germany. Although it was still too early in the war to 
advance any definite proposals, the foundation for the fu­
ture postwar Europe was laid at this first tripartite con­
ference. This was done when the foreign ministers, acting 
upon a motion introduced by Eden, established the European: 
Advisory Commission (EAC), with headquarters in London.
The EAC was to serve as a sounding board for Allied ideas; 
more specifically, it was designated to draw up detailed 
suggestions as to the postwar treatment of Germany. After 
emphasizing the warm atmosphere of confidence which charac­
terized the meeting, the official communique, issued on Nov­
ember 1, 19^3* made a rather hazy reference to initial steps
-^International Conciliation (ed.), Documents for the 
Year 19^3 (New York: Carnegie Endowment for international 
Peace, 19^3, Doc. 395), p. 600.
-^Hull, Memoirs, p. 1283.
37that had been taken in regard to the future of Germany.
For the first time at this conference, the dismemberment of
Germany was being considered. The idea, first developed in
the U.S. State Department, had found subsequent approval by
President Roosevelt; and although Secretary Hull personally
did not favor the plan, he presented the suggestion to his
Allied colleagues.Molotov reported it to Stalin. At the
following conference meeting, the Soviet Foreign Minister
gave his enthusiastic support to the proposal. The Russians
liked the idea so much that, with the consent of Hull, they
39resolved to make dismemberment a Soviet plan. 7
This first tripartite conference was concluded in. 
such good spirits, probably because the foreign ministers 
stayed on rather general ground. The hard bargaining ses­
sions when drafts would have to be hammered out in detail 
were still hidden in the future. General agreement was 
reached that Germany, with the exception of East Prussia 
which was to be completely detached from Germany, should be
reduced to her borders of 1937* All other questions were
no 1referred to the EAC for detailed study.
^ Basic American Documents, 19^1-A9; pp. 10-11.
^Hull, Memoirs, pp. 128A-1287.
39Ibid.
Lq
Ibid. See also Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, 
358*» and Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 298.
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The Teheran Conference: 
November 28-December
Encouraged by the harmony that characterized the 
Moscow Conference of Foreign Mini store, the Big Three were 
now anxious to meet in person. Roosevelt and Churchill* of 
course, were old acquaintances; neither one of them had yet 
encountered Stalin. The trio convened for their first sum­
mit meeting in the Persian capital of Teheran, from November 
28 to December 1, 1943. These days set the pattern for 
what was to follow. Stalin, showing his Jovial side as long 
as things were going his xvay, completely charmed Roosevelt, 
managing at the same time never to concede on a point of im­
portance. "Roosevelt felt sure that . . . Stalin was *geta- 
ble,1 despite his bludgeoning tactics and his attitude of
cynicism toward such matters as the rights of small na- 
42tions." The President was certain that Russia, her wishes
being granted, would be "cooperative in maintaining the
48peace of the postwar world."  ^ It might have been a bles-
41For the complete official American account of Tehe­
ran see? U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of 
the United States: Diplomatic Papers: The Conferences at 
Cairo and TehranT lW3l Department of State Publication No• 
7187 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 
1961). Hereafter cited as Foreign Relations: Tehran.
Note: Two ways of spelling the name of the Persian
capital, Teheran and/or Tehran, are correct. Different 
authors vary.
42Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 796-799
43rbld., p. 799.
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sing that he died before becoming utterly disillusioned.
During the Teheran Conference, harmony prevailed be­
tween Roosevelt and Stalin with only a minor discordant 
point arising. The Soviet leader casually questioned the 
astuteness of Unconditional Surrender as long as the impll- 
cations were not clearly defined to the Germans. ^ The sub­
ject was dropped, since more important topics were on the 
agenda. But Roosevelt did not forget Stalin*s criticism; 
this was the President*s brainchild with whioh he did not 
wish to be harassed. He expressed his irritation in a memo-
iiA
randum to Cordell Hull.
The most important military decision, to be reached
at Teheran, was the issue of the opening of the Second
Front. OVERLORD (the code name for the Atlantic invasion),
had been a matter of Anglo-American-Russian concern since
the very outset of their alliance. Prior to Stalingrad, the
Soviets had continually pressed for the Second Front, with
the intent to gain some relief for their beleaguered na­
il 7
tion. r Although plans were in the making, the West had so
Ixh
Gregory Klimov, The Terror Machine: The Inside Story 
of Soviet Administration in Germany, trans. H. C. Stevens 
(New Yorks Frederick A. Praeger Inc., Publ., 1953). p. 125. 
Hereafter cited as Klimov, The Terror Machine.
^ Foreign Relations: Tehran, p. 513*
1*6Elliott Roosevelt (ed.) F.D.R.: His Personal Let- 
ters: 1928-19^5 (New Yorks DueilT Sloan and Pearce, 1950),
p. 1485.
^Alexander Werth, Russia at Wars 19^1*19^5 (New Yorks
19
far been unable to respond with action. Allied forces were 
tied in the Mediterranean and the Pacific, Toward the end 
of 1943. the tide had turned. Russia's confidence increased 
daily due to the rapid westward advance of the Red Army,
Even though tremendous sacrifices lay still ahead, the Sovi- 
et Union was confident of final victory. Future political 
considerations, therefore, could again assume a more promi­
nent role in the minds of the Kremlin leaders? and they did. 
Soviet Foreign Vice-Commjssar Alexander Korneichuk was preoc­
cupied with political Implications of the Russian offensive. 
During the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, he indis­
creetly revealed to British war correspondent Werth:
Things are going so well on our front that it might 
be even better not to have the Second Front till 
next spring. If there were a Second Front right 
now, the Germans might allow Germany to be occupied 
by the Anglo-Americans, It would make us look pret­
ty silly. Better to go on bombing them for another 
winter; and also let their army freeze another win­
ter in Russia; then get the Red Army right up to 
Germany, and then start the Second Front. 9
The Russian's wish became reality; by D-Day, June 6, 1944,
the Red Army penetration into Eastern Europe was under way.
At Teheran, the launching date for OVERLORD was set
for May, 1944.-^ Preceding discussions at the conference
were sometimes stormy, Churchill's political instinct did
E, P, Dutton & Co., Inc., 1964), pp. 745-7^6. Hereafter 
cited as Werth, Russia at War,
48Ibld., p. 7^7. 49Ibld.
^Foreign Relations; Tehran, p. 576.
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not give in to Russian geniality. Suspecting possible Sovi­
et schemes, he suggested to support OVERLORD by simultan­
eously launching minor Allied invasions in Italy and through
the Eastern Mediterranean.-^ Stalin objected. ^  Since the
\
President failed to support the Prime Minister, this strate­
gy was abandoned. Roosevelt later recalled:
Whenever the P.M. argued for our invasion through 
the Balkans . . .it was quite obvious to everyone 
in the room what he really meant. That he was 
above all anxious to knife up into central Europe, 
in order to keep the Red Army out of Austria and Ru­
mania, even Hungary, if possible. Stalin knew it, I 
knew it, everybody knew it.*-'
Then he went on to say: "Trouble is, the P.M. is thinking 
too much of the postwar, and where England will be. Hefs 
scared of letting the Russians get too strong,"^ Consid­
ering that America, in spite of isolationist tendencies at 
home, had got embroiled in two world wars, originating in 
Europe, the Presidents lack of concern as to "the postwar" 
was both appalling and tragic. This attitude endeared him 
to the Russians who became deeply suspicious of Churchill. 
Roosevelt was spared when, only two months after Teheran, 
the Soviet Press embarked upon its first anti-Western cam­
paign. They charged the Prime Minister with conducting se-
5^Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 3^5*
-^Foreign Relations: Tehran, p. *f>90 and p. 537 *
-^Elliott Roosevelt, As He Saw It (New York: Duel!, 
Sloan and Pearce, Inc., 19^6), p p . l 8^-185*
5Vbia.
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cret peace negotiations with the Germans, the very thing 
of which they had been guilty at the end of World War I,
At the dinner meeting, following the days dispute 
over the Atlantic invasion, Stalin used every opportunity 
"to get a dig in at Mr. Churchill.Obviously, the Soviet 
Premier believed offense to be the best defense. He must 
have worried about the Prime Minister*s political percept­
iveness concerning Soviet schemes.
Another problem, discussed at Teheran, was the fate­
ful question of Polish frontiers. Although there still was 
a Polish government, functioning from exile in London, it 
had no administrative powers. Officially, the State of Po­
land had ceased to exist once the German armies had swept 
the country in September,.1939• She had been annexed to 
provide German Lebensraum. What had been Poland was divided 
between Germany and the Soviet Union in accordance with the 
secret clause of the Hitler-Stalin Paot.-^
It was up to the Big Three to reconstitute the Po­
lish territory. Churchill agreed with Stalin*s suggestion 
that the Poles would not be included in the preliminary
-^Werth, Russia at War, p. 755•
^ Foreign Relations: Tehran, p. 553-
<7
•^ 'It is interesting to note that Germany suffered a 
somewhat similar fate after World War II, although the situ­
ation was reversed--Germany, as a country, retained her ter­
ritory (at least part of it), but she had lost her sover­
eignty, since there was no German government. Sovereignty 
was not restored until May 5* 1955*
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talks, but that they might be asked to Join the discussions 
at a later stage. ^  At this crucial stage, people whose fu­
ture was about to be determined, were denied the right to 
voice their opinion--in direct contradiction to the Atlantic 
Charter.
At the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, ten­
tative agreement had been reached to reinstate Germany’s 
borders as of 1937.^ At Teheran, the Allies deviated for 
the first time from this plan. Stalin was interested in re­
taining the Polish territory which the Soviet Union had 
gained as her share of the Hitler-Stalin Pact. Xn order to 
win the Western Allies over to the Russian viewpoint, he 
suggested to compensate Poland at Germany’s expense. Poland 
was to move westward all the way to the Oder River.
Roosevelt withheld his opinion while Churchill, inspired by
the idea, compared the proposed border movement to soldiers1
6l“left close” drill exercise. To give even more color to
his comparison, he “illustrated his point with three matches
62representing the Soviet Union, Poland and Germany.” The 
Prime Minister’s response indicated his understanding of the 
Soviet plan, but not his'agreement. Foreign Minister Eden
-^Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 362.
*59J7Supra, p. 16.
Foreign Relations: Tehran, p. 510,
6lIbld.. p. 512. 62rbld.
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scornfully told the Russians that border they were proposing
coincided with the "Molotov-Ribbentrop Line.n^  Molotov
64-count ered that it was the Curzon Line, The Americans 
stayed out of this dispute, probably preferring to treat 
this intricate question as a matter of purely European con­
cern. For the time being, the problem was shelved. During 
the Yalta Conference, the plan would move again into the 
center of discussion.
The last important matter, briefly discussed at Teh­
eran, was Germany. Since the EAC had been established to
6 6work out detailed plans, J Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin 
were not under pressure to reach conclusive decisions. They 
were free to toss up whatever ideas they had in mind. Dis­
memberment was repeatedly mentioned until the talks were
66postponed for later consideration. Stalin suggested the
^ Ibid., pp. 599-600. Ribbentrop was the German For­
eign Minister who negotiated with Molotov the Hitler-Stalin 
Pact of 1939.
64-The territory under discussion east of those lines 
of demarkation had long been a source of dispute between 
Russia and Poland. The U.S.S.R. claimed it as part of White 
Russia and the Ukraine; Poland countered that the area was 
primarily inhabited by Poles. To settle the century old 
conflict, the Curzon line was drawn up by the Allies in 
1919* The Poles felt cheated. During the 1920*s, they re­
gained parts of the territory east of the Curzon line by 
armed raids, when the newly established Soviet Union was too 
weak to resist. For details see Gebhardt (ed.), Handbuch 
der Deutschen Geschlchte, Vol. IV, p. 104-.
-'Supra, p. 15.
66
Foreign Relations: Tehran, pp. 600-603*
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execution of the entire German officer’s corps as a precau­
tion to prevent a rebirth of German aggression. Churchill 
was shocked; Roosevelt took it as a Joke.*^ Macabre remarks 
of this nature made it obvious that the Big Three had run 
out of valid topics demanding immediate, combined delibera­
tions.
Before final adjournment of the Teheran Conference,
68they issued the "Declaration of the Three Powers.” The 
declaration, reinforcing the Atlantic Charter, also gave 
ringing endorsement to Allied unity. To the public the Al­
lied leaders conveyed the illusion that they were: "friends
69in fact, in spirit and in purpose." 7
Presenting the enemy with a united front has always 
been one of the most effective propaganda tricks. There­
fore, public criticism of the President’s war policies by 
members of the U.S. Congress might have been Interpreted by 
constituents as unpatriotic. On the surface it appeared as 
if Roosevelt’s policies found full approval, since critics 
of his administration were helpless. Roosevelt failed to 
inform Congress about plans developed at the Allied confer-
^^Wl111am D. Leahy, I Was There: The Personal Story 
of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman 
Based on His Notes andTDiaries Made at the Time (New York, 
London, Toronto: whlttlesey House, 1950), p. 206* Hereafter 
cited as Leahy, I Was There.
^ Foreign Relations: Tehran, pp. 6*10-641.
69rbld., p. 641.
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ences.*^ Secrecy, necessitated by war security measures,
provided him with a convenient excuse. Senator Vandenberg,
distrusting the President, noted in March, 1944: "I deeply
fear that there are many sad and tragic disillusionments a- 
71head.”' Vandenberg's pessimism, however prophetic, was an 
exception to the general prevailing mood. As 19^3 changed 
to 1944, most people felt that they had sound reasons to be 
optimistic. The chain of Allied military victories appeared 
to be unending? and, according to the news releases, the in­
tensified diplomatic activities seemed to forge the alliance 
into genuine international friendship.
70Vandenberg Papers, pp. 91-92. 
71Ibld.. p. 92.
CHAPTER II
FROM THE SECOND QUEBEC CONFERENCE TO THE YALTA CONFERENCE
19kk -  19^ 5
The Second Quebec Conference:
S ept ember 11-17, 19 W
During 19*J4, the war entered the final stage. As 
the aimed forces of the United Nations came dangerously 
close to her borders* defeat of Germany became Inevitable. 
The Red Army threatened from the East; the Anglo-American 
forces, after the successful European invasion through Nor­
mandy, pushed on from the West. Germany*s final collapse 
was only a matter of time. Therefore, the issue of a post­
war settlement became more pressing. Diplomatic activities 
had to increase in order to keep up with the rapid military 
advances. On the national and international scene, postwar 
plans for Germany entered a more definite stage. It became 
evident in the subsequent conferences that national inter­
ests became more pronounoed, yet the Big Three continued to 
strive for cooperation.
Roosevelt and Churohill met at Quebec in September 
i9^» to reconsider and coordinate Anglo-American policy. 
The treatment to be aocorded postwar Germany was the main
26
27
topic on the agenda.^" The Second Quebec Conference gained a
prominent place in history, because the Morgenthau Plan,
which aimed at reducing Germany to a predominantly pastoral
society, though later rejected, was tentatively approved at 
2
this meeting.
Serious divergencies had previously arisen among the 
members of the U.S. Cabinet. The plan, contrary to the us­
ual assumption, had not been developed by Henry Morgenthau, 
Jr., the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, but rather had its 
origin in the lower echelon of the War Department, where a
Colonel Bernstein, disregarding usual Army channels, for-
3warded a copy to Secretary Morgenthau. The latter picked 
up the idea and presented it to the President, in August 
19^. At this time, only two-and-a-half months after the 
United States had suffered heavy casualties in operation 
OVERLORD, Roosevelt was in no mood to show mercy toward the 
enemy. He adopted Mor&anthaufs plan and, in a memorandum to 
Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, reprimanded the War De-
^B. M. Ratchford and Wm. D. Ross, Berlin Reparations 
Assignment; Round One of the German Peace"Settlement (Chapel 
Hill7 The University of North Carolina Press, 19^7), P* 30. 
Hereafter cited as Ratchford and Ross, Berlin Reparations 
Assignment.
2
Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People,
p. 760.
^Walter MiIlls (ed.), The Forrestal Diaries (New 




partment for being too "soft” on Germany, Roosevelt 
thought that:
the Germans * . . should be stripped clean and 
should not have a level of subsistence above the 
lowest level of the people they had conquered.3
U.S. Army soup kitchens could supply the Germans well enough
to keep them alive.^ In the memorandum to Stimson, the
President further stated:
The German people as a whole must have it driven 
home to them that the whole nation has been engaged 
in a lawless conspiracy against the decencies of mod­
ern civilization.?
This statement was in contradiction to Rooseveltfs qualify­
ing remarks at the Casablanca press conference, when he an­
nounced his policy of Unconditional Surrender, explaining 
that it would not mean the destruction of people but of
o
philosophies. But it expressed his line of thoughts just 
prior to his meeting with Churchill at Quebec. It was in 
this mood that Roosevelt appointed Morgenthau to head a com­
mittee dealing with German affairs, much to the dismay of 
both Hull and Stimson.^
Probably the most amazing aspect in the Morgenthau
-
Hull, Memoirs, p. 1602.
^Forrestal Diaries, p. 10.
6Ibid. See also Hull, Memoirs, p. 1602.
^Hull, Memoirs, p. 1602.
^Supra, p . 11*
^Forrestal Diaries, p. 11.
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Plan episode was the fact that the Secretary of State was 
hardly consulted on the issue, Hull learned of the adoption 
of the plan when he got a copy of Roosevelt*s memorandum to 
Stimson of August 26, 19*14.10 Beoause diplomacy and strate­
gy Intermingled during the war, the Departments of State and 
War worked along similar though separate lines toward a 
peace settlement. The Department of the Treasury, however, 
had hitherto not been considered to be responsible for the 
task of forming or advanolng postwar policies concerning 
Germany, At Quebec, Churchill was surprised to see Morgen­
thau in the capacity of presidential adviser rather than
11Hull, who had been left behind in Washington. In spite of
the Prime Minister*s strong opposition to the plan, the
President and his Secretary of the Treasury eventually got
Churchill to give it a ohance by agreeing to serious, joint 
12consideration. Correlating Germany’s Industrial power 
with her war potential, they argued that her industry had to 
be eliminated in order to prevent a rebirth of the German 
threat.^
Once back in England, after having escaped the per­
suasive powers of his American counterpart, Churchill felt
■**°Hull, Memoirs, p. 1602.
■^Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. VI: 
Triumph and Tragedy (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953) 
p. 156. Hereafter cited as Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy.
12Ibld. 13Ibld.
30
that the Morgenthau Plan would carry the idea of subjecting
1/4,
Germany ,fto an ultralogical conclusion.” He agreed with
15his War Cabinet that the proposal should not be adopted.
American Cabinet members reacted in a similar way,
when Morgenthau*s seeming success became known. Secretary
16 17of State Hull was furious; he resigned two months later.
Secretary of War Stimson had been opposed to the Plan from
the beginning. He implored the President to abandon the
18idea of ”a peace of vengeance.” It was the fear of the 
War Department, as expressed by Assistant Secretary John J. 
McCloy, that the Morgenthau Plan would throw Germany into 
poverty, disorder, and chaos. This would immensely in­
crease the difficulties of the American Army whose Job it 
would be to restore order, following the anticipated total 
collapse of the Third R e i c h . ^  Paced with opposition at 
home and abroad, Roosevelt dropped the Plan. The President 
mentioned to Secretary Stimson that he could not recall how 
it had come to this Quebec agreement. ”It must have been
l2frbld., p. 157. 15Ibid.
Forrestal Diaries, p. 11.
17'Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People,
P. 911.
18James P. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York and Lon­
dons Harper & Brothers Publishers,' 1947), p. 186. Hereafter 
cited as Byrnes, Speaking Frankly.
•^Forrestal Diaries, pp* 11-12.
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done . . . without much thought ;n Roosevelt said. Remnants
of the Morgenthau Plan survived, and were to haunt American
21efforts for the first two postwar years.
The only other Important plan concerning postwar 
Germany, under consideration at the Second Quebec Confer­
ence, was the matter of Allied zones of occupation in Ger­
many. The Combined Chiefs of Staff presented a report which
22was unanimously approved. The combined chiefs suggested 
to award northwestern Germany to Great Britain; southwestern 
Germany was to go to the united States. Additionally, the 
United States would receive the port cities of Bremen and 
Bremerhaven so as to get direct access to the North Sea.
This area would constitute an American enclave within the 
British occupation zone. American passage to and from the 
enclave through the British zone was guaranteed.^ As it 
turned out, the latter point had no particular importance, 
since the United States and the United Kingdom continued to 
cooperate even after the end of the war. In view of the 
work of the European Advisory Commission and the later So­
viet challenge of free access to Berlin, it invited compar­
ison.
20Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 186.
21
Infra, pp. 92-93.
22Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 160.
23Ibld.
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The Work of the EAC
The EAC, formed to develop detailed plans for the 
Big Three occupation of Germany, had reached a draft agree­
ment at the same time that Roosevelt and Churchill met in 
Quebec. A protocol on the zones of occupation and on the
status of Berlin had been signed by the Big Three represent-
. . 2katives to the EAC on September 12, 19^4. The draft was 
subject to ratification by the Allied governments; it was 
approved by the united Kingdom in December.19^4, followed by 
the approval of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. at the time of 
the Yalta Conference in February 19^5*^ Germany, within 
her 1937 borders, was partitioned into three zones of occu­
pation, of which the Soviet Union secured about two-thirds—  
all of central and eastern Germany. Berlin, lying ca. 150 
miles deep within the Soviet Zone, was equally split up in­
to occupation sectors. The pattern of division corresponded 
to the rest of Germany: The eastern portion was given to
the Soviets, the British got the northwestern section of
town, and the Americans took the southern part of the 
26city. Free access to Berlin was not mentioned in the doc­
ument.
This and subsequent fateful omissions were caused by
2kOtto M. von der Gablentz (ed.), Documents on the 
Status of Berlin: 19*4-1959 (Mftnchen: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 
l9i>9)» PP. 1B-2I". Hereafter cited as Berlin Documents.
25ibia.. p. 20, 21. 26Ibld.. p. 19, 21,
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split authority* Too many groups worked on the solution to
the German problem; frustration was bound to be the result.
Apart from the difficulty of reaching agreement with the
Russians, American endeavors were overshadowed by divergent
opinions, expressed by representatives of the Departments of
State, of War, and by personal envoys of the President. The
only unifying directive was Roosevelts expressed desire to
get along with the Russians and to convince the Soviets of
27the sincere American wish to cooperate with them* '
Different Americans believed in different approaches 
of how to best impress this upon the Soviet leaders. John 
C. Winant, U.S. Representative on the European Advisory Com­
mission, thought that agreement had been reached because he
had managed to gain the confidence of his Russian counter-
28part, F. T. Gousev. As a close personal friend of Roose­
velt, Winant, although officially a member of the State De­
partment, completely bypassed this channel of communication,
29feeling responsible to the President, only. 7 James Riddle- 
berger, a career diplomat and a member of the American EAC 
delegation, envisioned the dangerous pitfall of an American 
sector in a Berlin, surrounded by the Soviet Zone. Since 
free access from the Western zones to the Western sectors
27fRobert D. Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors (Garden 
City, New Yorks Doubleday and Co., Inc.7 196^), p. 227. 
Hereafter cited as Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors.
28Ibld.. p. 232. 29Ibld.
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had not been secured, Riddleberger developed a drastically 
new plan. Presenting his idea to Winant, Riddleberger col­
lided head-on with his superior:
Winant accused me ["Riddleberger] of not having 
any faith in Soviet intentions and I replied that 
on this he was exactly right. . . .  I then suggest­
ed that the three zones should converge upon Berlin 
as the center of a pie, but this idea got nowhere be­
cause Winant was very much opposed to it.*5
Ambassador Robert D. Murphy, who had Just been appointed
political adviser on German affairs-^ and who was to further
distinguish himself in the first postwar years in Berlin
working hand in hand with the later American Military Gover-
32nor, General Lucius D. Clay, arrived in London in Septem­
ber 1944, when the tide of emotions over the EAC protocol 
was still running high. Peeling as uncomfortable as Riddle­
berger about the lack of guaranteed access routes to Berlin, 
Murphy showed his perceptiveness of Russian shrewdness in 
remarking to Winant that "[the Soviets] were sharp bargain­
ers who expected other people to be the same.** ^  sensing 
the Implication and resenting it, Winant sharply repriman­
ded the Ambassador;
You [Murphy] have no right to come along at this 
late date and make such a proposal Just after we 
have agreed upon a draft I ^
3°Ibld., p. 231. 31Ibld., p. 226.
3^Infra. p. 60.
33-'-'Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, p. 231.
34Ibld.
35
Winant*s anxiety that his accomplishment could possibly be 
frustrated by career diplomats was unfounded, Riddleberg­
er1 s suggestion was never taken into serious consideration, 
and Murphy had no authority over Winant. The issue remained 
unsettled.
Tolling with the question of Allied administration 
of Germany, the EAC continued to work out details. The next 
agreement was reached on November 14, 1944.-^ Upon the Un­
conditional Surrender of Germany, an Allied Control Council 
was to assume supreme governing authority. The Control 
Council would consist of the Allied Military Governors and 
their staffs. The Control Council was to ensure uniformity 
of actions in regard to questions concerning Germany as a 
whole. Decisions would have to be unanimous. In this 
time of happy Anglo-American-Soviet unity, the latter pro­
vision might have appeared harmless. However, once the Rus­
sians saw fit to drop the mask, the veto power became their 
favorite tool to torpedo Western attempts in cooperative 
Allied administration.
While the Military Governors would have supreme au­
thority in their respective zones, and the Control Council 
would only be used as an instrument for over-all policy, 
the constitutional make-up of the German capital was to be
•^Berlin Documents, pp. 22-24.
•^Ibid., p. 22. See also Pels, Churchill, Roosevelt. 
Stalin, pp. 359^360*
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different. Berlin, it was planned, would be under joint 
Allied administration, constituting a separate entity from 
the rest of Germany.-^ The city would be governed by an 
inter-Allied Kommandatura, constituted by the Allied Com­
mandants, that is the commanders of the different Berlin 
sectors and their staffs. The Kommandatura would be subor­
dinate to the Control Council.^ The November 14 EAC agree- 
ment was subsequently approved by the Big T h r e e . W i t h  the 
aoceptance of those suggestions, the EAC had served its pur­
pose; and since EAC plans were Instrumental in shaping the 
postwar world, the institution gained fame.
The Moscow Conference:
October 8-18. 194*T
High level deliberations concerning the postwar per­
iod were neither confined to Quebeo nor to London. The 
spectacular advance of the Red Army enabled the Kremlin 
leaders to cast their horizons of foreign policy beyond the 
limits of the Soviet Union. Mother Russia^ victory would 
allow a return to the over-all Communist goal— world domin­
ation. Germany had always been central to Soviet thinking. 
Her geographic position, in the center of Europe was largely 
responsible for her importance in world power factors. Len­
in had recognized this and had advocated the conversion of
^^Berlin Documents, p. 23.
38Ibld. 39Ibld.. p. Zk.
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Germany to communism, but the previous attempts of a take­
over had failed,^ Events of July 20, 1944, when German re­
sistance. fighters had vainly tried to assassinate Hitler, 
had indicated that the chances to establish communism in Ger­
many had not improved over the years, German underground
Al
fighters tended toward the democratic West, Therefore,
the Soviet union could not expect to look toward Germany as
a potential ally against the Western capitalists, Stalin
imagined instead the creation of a strong Communist Poland
42to serve as a buffer, and the incorporation into the realm
of Soviet influence of as much of Europe as possible.
Churchill, meanwhile, as a seasoned veteran in power
politics, had made a realistic appraisal of the situation.
Since his plan to cut into the “soft under-belly” of Europe
by launching a second invasion from the Balkans had not been
43approved at Teheran, Eastern Europe was open to Red Army 
conquest. The Prime Minister went to Moscow to confer with 
the Soviet Premier one month after the Quebec meeting. 
Churchill wanted to arrive at a compromise with Stalin in an
40
After World War I, the Communist inspired Spartacus 
Group attempted to cause a revolt but was defeated. For de­
tails sees Gebhardt (ed.), Handbuch der Deutschen Gesch- 
ichte, Vol. IV, p. 99.
41Boris Meissner, Russland, die Westmachte und 
Deutschland; Die Sowjetlsche Deutschlandpolitik: 19^3-1953 
(Hamburg:' H . H . NqIke Verlag,' X9f>3)',r p. 36. Hereafter cited 
as Meissner, Russland, die Westmachte und Deutschland.
**2Ibld. ^ Supra. pp. 19-20.
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effort to save as much of Europe as possible. The issue was 
settled among them at their first Kremlin meeting. At Chur­
chill^ suggestion, Rumania and Bulgaria were to be domi­
nated by Russia; in Hungary and Yugoslavia, Russian and
Western predominance were to be equally shared; and Greece
44
was to come under British influence. Realizing that the
whole deal had taken only a few minutes, Churohill felt a
pang of conscience:
Might it not be thought rather cynical if it seemed 
we disposed of these issues, so fateful to millions 
of people, in such an offhand manner?
Stalin reassured him.
In contrast to their encounter at Teheran, the Mos­
cow meeting of the two leaders was characterized by harmony.
Churchill commended ”the great chief of the Russian 
46State” in glowing terms at a Moscow press conference.
The Prime Minister's main purpose in conferring with the So- 
1 vlet^Premier seems to have been guided by the desire to ap­
pease Stalin. Privately, Churchill never condoned the Geor­
gian's tactics.
Soviet schemes became quite evident, again, when the 
topio of discussion centered on the Polish question. Stalin 
kept insisting on the Curzon line as the future border be­
44“ Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 227. 
^ Ibld.. pp. 227-228.
46Werth, Russia at War, p. 915*
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tween the U.S.S.R. and Poland. Under the cover of wishing 
to fully compensate Poland, Stalin suggested for the first 
time to move Poland not only as far west as the Oder River 
but instead all the way to the Neisse River, and also to in­
clude the German cities of Breslau and Stettin in the future 
Poland.^ The Polish Premier of the government-in-exile, 
Stanislaw Mikolajczyke, was present in Moscow. He refused 
to accept the Curzon line, angering Churchill who wanted him
to come to terms with both the Kremlin and its so-called
IlQ
Lubin Polish National Committee. Compromise, the British 
Prime Minister felt, was better than the total loss of Po­
land to the democratic cause. No settlement was reached.
Leaving Moscow, Churchill was more justified than 
ever before in his suspicion toward Soviet intentions. The 
Lubin Poles "were mere pawns of Russia.”^  They gave Chur­




The Crimean Conference, better known as the Yalta 
Conference, came to be regarded as the most controversial of
hn
'Meissner, Russland die Weltmachte und Deutchland.
P. 36.
Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 235♦
^Ibld.
40
the Big Three meetings. Based on Roosevelt*s idealistic 
concept of an indivisible world, Yalta was hailed as proof 
that the Soviets and Western powers could peacefully work 
together.^ When the strife of the first postwar years 
brought about disillusionment, Western leaders attempted to 
justify the Yalta decisions, arguing that they were necessi­
tated by the still most important aim of the United Nations 
at the time— the defeat of G e r m a n y . A t  Yalta, the Soviet 
Union was in a comfortable position. Since the victory at 
Stalingrad, the Red Army had steadily advanced and was well 
within the eastern part of Germany, when the Conference con­
vened.^2 Russia*s imperial ambitions increased with every 
additional mile penetrated by the Red Army. Accordingly, 
she became more demanding toward her Allies, attempting to 
cloud her intentions with slogans calling for guarantees of
*53
Russian zones of s e c u r i t y . D u e  to the military develop­
ment, Great Britain and the United States were faced with a 
new balance of power among the Allies. The Yalta decisions 
resulted from this new East-West balance.*' This changed
-^Meissner, Russland, die Weltmachte und Deutchland,
P. 53. * :
'’■'"Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 402.
*52
Letter from Mrs. Liese - Lotte Grosse, German house­
wife, Essen, Germany, April 20, 19^7*
^Dallln, The Big Three, p. 273.
^ John L. Snell, et al,, The Meaning; of Yalta; Big 
Three Diplomacy and the New Balance of Power (Baton Rouge:
41
relationship of the distribution of power allowed the Soviet 
Union to return to the Marxist-Leninist guideline which pro­
jected two opposing world camps* In accordance with these 
traditional Communist beliefs, the U.S.S.R. attempted to 
secure as many satellite states as possible, in preparation 
of the future fight for the predominance in Europe and 
Asia.^
Thus, the stage for the Yalta Conference was set.
The Soviets arrived intent on furthering their plans. Chur­
chill, though well aware of the Russian danger, would again, 
as at the Teheran Conference, have to resign to the fact 
that he was unable to prevent Communist gains, as long as 
President Roosevelt was unwilling to give up his idealistic 
concept of the Russians. This did not happen. Only half-a- 
year before the Yalta meeting, Roosevelt had said in a con­
versation with Mikolajczyks
Stalin is a realist, . . . and we mustn*t forget 
when we judge Russian actions that the Soviet re­
gime has had only few years of experience in inter­
national relations. But of one thing I fm certains 
Stalin is not an imperialist.5°
Keeping in mind the differing attitudes of the Big Three
Louisiana State University Press, 1956), p. ix. Hereafter 
cited as Snell, The Meaning of Yalta.
-^Meissner, Russland. die Weltmachte und Deutschland,
P- 54.
^John 'Poland, The Last 100 Days (New Yorks Random 
House, 1966), p. 44. Hereafter cited as Toland, The Last 
100 Days.
leaders toward one another, the outcome of Yalta was in no 
way amazing.
The Polish question demanded again a prominent place 
on the agenda. Since the Red Array had occupied the Polish 
territory, the West was confronted with a fait accompli and 
had no choice but to accept it. For the sake of Allied uni* 
ty, the United States and Great Britain agreed to grant re- 
cognition to the Provisional Government of P oland,basi* 
cally made up of Lublin Poles. Recognition was withdrawn 
from the Polish government-in-exile, when they refused to 
abide by the Yalta decision which was regarded by the Poles 
as a verdict Min a b s e n t i a . A f t e r  the Soviets had se­
cured recognition of their Polish government, agreement was
reached to consider the Curzon line as the Polish-Russian 
<9
border. To compensate Poland at Germany's expense, was
not a new idea. It had first found expression at the Teher- 
60an Conference, and had been brought up in the Stalin-Chur-
6lchill Moscow talks. As at Moscow, when Churchill had re­
mained uncommitted, Stalin again asked for the Oder-Neisse
-^U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 
United States: Diplomatic Papers: The Conferences at Malta 
and Yalta: 19 $51 Department of State Publication No. 6199 
(Wa shi ngton: Uni ted States Government Printing Office,
1955) > P* 973* Hereafter cited as Foreign Relations; Yalta.
^^Jan Ciechanowski, Defeat in Victory (Garden City:
New Yorks Doubleday and Company, I n c , I9V 7), p. 396.
^ Foreign Relations: Yalta, p. 97^*
Supra, p. 22. ^Supra, p. 39*
^3
Line at Yalta. This time, the Prime Minister objected,
stating that he did not want to "stuff the Polish goose un-
til it dies of German indigestion." He was conscious of
the fact that England would not favorably react to the
forced deportation of millions of people. ^ Although Stalin
maintained that no Germans were left in the territory under
6kdiscussion, having presumably all fled from the Red Army, 
Churchill would not have it. The matter was dropped and re­
ferred to the Peace Conference for a final dec!sion.^
Essentially, the Big Three meeting at Yalta followed 
the pattern first established at Teheran— and not only in 
matters of procedure. As at Teheran, Stalin, Churchill and 
Roosevelt met at Yalta with the intention of adopting de­
finite measures. Again, agreement could only be reached on 
general subjects. Specific plans would be discussed but de­
cisions would be postponed to a later, unspecified time.
One such issue was the question of German repara­
tions. Stalin suggested to set the bill at twenty billion 
dollars, demanding fifty percent of the total for the 
U.S.S.R. The United States, Great Britain, and all other
62Foreign Relations: Yalta, p. 720.
63Ibld. 6**Ibld.
3Ibld.. p. 97^. Up to this date, there has been no 
Peace Treaty for Germany. The German territories east of 
the Oder-Neisse line have been de facto under Polish admin­
istration since the end of World War II. They make up about 
one-third of Germany of 1937* De jure, recognition has 
never been granted to the Oder-Neisse line by the West.
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countries with a rightful claim were to share the other half
66of the reparations. At this point, President Roosevelt
recalled the situation which had arisen after World War I,
when the United States had made loans to Germany to enable
her to pay her reparations. Roosevelt thought that the
United States would not want to finance another such pro=
67gram. r He dropped his punitive idea of feeding Germany by
68,fArmy soup kitchens” and declared instead:
I envision a Germany that is self sustaining but not 
starving. There will be no lending of money. • . . 
leave Germany enough industry and work to keep her
from starving. ^
Roosevelt also recommended the creation of a reparation com­
mission to work out details.^ Such a commission was con­
stituted with the seat in Moscow. Twenty billion dollars
71were adopted "as a basis for discussion,"f and the Big
72Three agreed to allot fifty percent to the U.S.S.R.
By the time the Big Three convened at Yalta, the EAC 
drafts for the occupation and control of Germany had been
66Ratchford and Ross, Berlin Reparations Assignment,
P. 39.
6 7
'Snell, The Meaning of Yalta, p. 59. See also Leahy, 
I Was There. p. 3o£.
^ Supra, p. 28.
^Snell, The Meaning of Yalta, p. 59*
7°Ibld.
^ Foreign Relations: Yalta, p. 983.
^ b i d .
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approved by their governments.^ The question of Anglo-
American access to Berlin had been considered a minor point
74which could be settled later by the zone commanders. The
7*5point was left in suspension at this Big Three Conference.  ^
Unconditional Surrender, though, in connection with 
intentions to dismember and to occupy Germany, became an is­
sue once again. The British Prime Minister maintained that
German resistance to the Allied war effort would increase if
76they were told about the dismemerment plans. The Presi­
dent agreed with the Soviet Premier that it should be in­
cluded in the terms of surrender.^ Roosevelt thought that 
because of German suffering in the war, ®*. . . psychological 
warfare would [not] affect them any longer „ . The Up-
Supra. pp. 32, 36.
^Feis, Churchill. Roosevelt, Stalin, p. 533.
7 6f Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Roosevelt and the Rus­
sians: The Yalta Conference (Garden City, New York: Double- 
day and Company, Inc., 19^9)» PP. 124-125. Hereafter cited 
as Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians.
77Ibld.
7 Ibid. Roosevelt was quite right. Germans, espec- 
ially Berliners, had other things on their minds. Only one 
day before the opening of the Yalta Conference, the Allies 
had staged another super air attack on the city. As a re­
sult, Berliners were concerned with more pressing problems—  
to bury their dead. Due to the many casualties in the Al­
lied raid of February 3* 1945* coffins were extremely 
scarce. It took some people three days of search to locate 
one. Reference to this episode was taken from a letter from 
Mrs. Liese-Lotte Gr^osse, German housewife* Essen* Germany* 
April 20, 196?.
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shot of the discussion was a compromise. When the communi­
que of the Yalta Conference was released to the press on 
February 12, 1945# reference was made to the projected Al­
lied zones of occupation; but the exact terms for Uncondi­
tional Surrender were to be withheld until after the capit­
ulation of Germany.^
Another matter concerning Germany was the admission
of France to the "extremely exclusive club" of the Big 
80Three. Stalin raised some objections but in the end it 
was agreed to carve a French zone and sector out of the Am­
erican and British zones and sectors respectively. An in­
vitation to France granting her membership on the Allied
81Control Council was postponed to a later time.
^ Foreign Relations; Yalta, p. 970. Actually, Big 
Three concern in this matter was unfounded, although they 
did not know it. The German Armed Forces High Command'(OKW) 
was familiar with Allied plans of occupation. A complete 
copy of "Operation Eclipse" [the planfs code namej had been 
captured from the British during the German Ardennes offen­
sive, in January, 1945* For the complete story see: Corne­
lius Ryan, The Last Battle (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1966), pp. 96-97# 99-102. Hereafter cited as Ryan, The Last 
Battle.
On the whole, Germans were better informed than 
might have been expected. Although their knowledge about 
"Operation Eclipse" was not as detailed as that of their 
leaders, the official NSDAP newspaper Vblklscher Beobachter 
made a first reference to the impending Yalta Conference on 
February 2, 1945. On February 12, 1945# a long report sum­
med up what had become known of the conference, cited the 
Swiss newspaper Z^rlcher Zeltung as its source. See: Letter 
from Mrs. Llese - Lotte Grosse, April 20, 1967.
80Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians, p. 128.
81Ibid#, pp. 126-128# See also: Foreign Relations; 
Yalta, p. 978, and Leahy. I Was There, pp. 301-302.
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Just like the conference at Teheran, the Yalta Con­
ference gave reinforcement to the Atlantic Charter. With 
the Declaration on Liberated Europe, the Allies pledged 
their
• • . determination to build in cooperation with 
other peace-loving nations a world order under law, 
dedicated to peace, security, freedom and the gener­
al well-being of all mankind.82
This did not ring true to some critics of the Roosevelt ad­
ministration in the United States. When questioned at a 
press conference, held aboard U.S.S. Quincy en route from 
Yalta, about his interpretation of the Atlantic Charter and 
the application of its ideas to Poland, the President evaded 
the issue. He called the Atlantic Charter "a beautiful 
idea11 that had been drawn up to boost England's morale in 
her darkest hour of need.*^
On March 1, 19^5* President Roosevelt reported to 
Congress on the Yalta Conference. Senator Vandenberg, as 
a long-time critic of the administration, came away uncon­
vinced that progress had been achieved. Because of the 
treatment accorded to Poland, he considered publicly to de­
nounce the Yalta agreements, but then decided to abide by
82Foreign Relations: Yalta, p. 972.
QO
-'Samuel I. Rosenman (ed.), The Public Papers and Ad­
dresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1944-^5 Vol*: Victory and 
the Threshold o f Peace (New York: Harper and Brothers Pub­
lishers, 1950), p. 564.
8^ I M d .. pp. 572-57**.
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8 <
the Roosevelt-Churchill f,stamp of approval." J
The Big Three themselves seemed to have sensed that 
the road to continued cooperation in the postwar world would 
be filled with obstacles. As if to remind themselves, Chur­
chill, Roosevelt and Stalin declared:
Only with continuing and growing co-operation 
and understanding among our three countries and among 
all the peace-loving nations can the highest aspira­
tion of humanity be realized— a secure and lasting 
peace which will, in the words of the Atlantic Char­
ter, ,fafford assurance that all men in all the lands 
may live out their lives in freedom from fear and 
want."*50
The Yalta Conference— so-called high tide of Allied unity- 
closed on this note.
^ Vandenberg Papers, p, 155-156,
86Foreign Relations: Yalta, p, 975.
CHAPTER III
FROM THE LAST WEEKS OF THE WAR TO THE POTSDAM CONFERENCE
)
MARCH TO AUGUST 19^5 
SHAEF1s Berlin Decision
After the adjournment of the Yalta Conference, the 
responsibility fell on the military for the concluding oper­
ations of World War II, The familiar pattern of statesmen 
and politicians issuing military directives of strategic im­
portance was reversed when General Eisenhower, the Supreme 
Allied Commander in the European Theater of War, decided 
against an Allied drive toward Berlin* This fateful deci­
sion was to be of lasting consequence in the ensuing politi­
cal struggle between East and West.
Eisenhower^ judgment was based upon military evi­
dence, fact as well as fiction. The fact was that during 
the last week of March, 19^5# the Allied Expeditionary For­
ces had crossed the Rhine River and had encircled the Ruhr 
pocket, Germanyfs most Important industrial area.3" So far, 
the Anglo-American armies had advanced with breath-taking
^Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden 
City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 194B’), p. 396. 
Hereafter cited as Elsenhower, Crusade in Europe.
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speed. Looking toward Berlin, still approximately three
hundred miles to the east, Eisenhower feared the logistic
problem which would result from outrunning his supplies,
should he venture to thrust a major spearhead toward the
German capital. Since the Red Army had reached the Oder
River* only about thirty miles east of Berlin, he reasoned
that a race for Berlin was senseless. The Soviet forces
2
were in a better position to capture the city.
The fictitious basis for Eisenhower^ decision, in 
comparison to these sober facts, was much more intriguing. 
American intelligence had supplied the Supreme Headquarters 
of the Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) with reports of 
Nazi planning for a so-called "National Redoubt" in the Ba­
varian Alps.^ As a result of German propaganda calling for 
ceaseless resistance, it was feared that after the defeat of 
the German armed forces, Nazi elite troops would retreat to 
the stronghold in an effort to prevent the inevitable— the 
end of the Third Reich. Eisenhower1s opinion in this matter
coincided with the assumption of American intelligence that
l±
prolonged guerilla fighting could result. A fantastic in­
telligence account, dated March 11, 19^5» stated the fol-
2Ibld.
^Jean Edward Smith, The Defense of Berlin (Baltimore, 
Maryland; The Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), P. 37• Hereafter 
cited as Smith, The Defense of Berlin. See also Eisenhower, 
Crusade in Europe, p. 397.
Il
Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 397*
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lowing:
Here [in the Bavarian mountains], defended by na­
ture and by the most efficient secret weapons yet 
invented, the powers that have hitherto guided Ger­
many will survive to reorganize her resurrection; 
here armaments will be manufactured in bomb-proof 
factories, food and equipment will be stored in vast 
underground caverns and specially selected corps 
of young men will be trained in guerilla warfare, so 
that a whole underground army can be fitted and di­
rected to liberate Germany from occupying forces.*
The Supreme Allied Commander decided to spoil Germany*s at­
tempt at harassing Allied efforts.^ Captured German offi­
cers denied any knowledge of the "National Redoubt" which in 
turn strengthened SHAEP*s belief in the existence of this 
stronghold.^ Under these circumstances, Eisenhower "felt
it to be more than unwise, it . • • [would be] stupid" to go 
8for Berlin. He decided instead to thrust his major drive 
toward the south and to halt the Allied advance at the Elbe 
River. There, he would Join forces with the Russians.
To correlate his strategy with that of the Red Army, 
Eisenhower informed Stalin of his plan.^ The Soviet Premier 
oabled back agreeing with the General that Berlin had lost 
its former strategic importance, and that he, too, would di-
^Smith, The Defense of Berlin, p. 37*
£
Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 397*
^Smith, Defense of Berlin, p. 37*
Q
Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 396.
9Ibld., p. 398.
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vert his forces toward the South,3,0 The answer was a typi­
cal example of Communist deceit; the Kremlin leaders never 
trusted theifc Western Allies. As an expert in clouding the 
Soviet Union*s postwar intentions but keeping these goals 
always uppermost in mind, Stalin assumed the Allies adhered 
to similar tactics. He believed that Eisenhower*s message 
was an attempt to divert the Red Army from its ultimate goal 
of capturing Berlin, luring it southward instead. The Sovi­
et Marshals Georgi K. Zhukov and Ivan Stepanovich Koniev 
were hastily recalled from the front for a Kremlin confer­
ence. Plying on the personal rivalry between the two,
Stalin ordered them to race their armies to Berlin.11
Stalin was not completely wrong in his disbelief of 
Western blindness as to the importance of Berlin. Eisen­
hower* s decision was viewed with mingled feelings not only 
among SHAEF*s staff but also at the highest governmental 
levels in London and Washington. His correspondence with 
Stalin caused quite a stir. While Eisenhower maintained 
that his action had been within the range of his responsi­
bility,12 British Prime Minister Churchill felt that the su­
preme Allied Commander had overstepped the limits of his
10Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 460. See also
Ryan, The Last Battle, p. 252.
■^Ryan, The Last Battle, pp. 243-244, 247, 249-251.
12Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 399 •
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authority.^
Churchill viewed the Red Army's advance with deep 
concern. He recognized the need of checking Soviet imperial 
alms. The European map was a strategic chess board. To 
come out at least at par with the U.S.S.R. after the cessa­
tion of hostilities, Churchill advocated to push as far east
as possible, making Berlin "the prime and true objective of
14the Anglo-American armies.”
In an effort to win his American Allies over to his
viewpoint, Churchill sent a telegram to the American Chiefs
of Staff, emphasizing the political and psychological sig-
1 <
nificance of Berlin. J But Washington stood firmly behind 
Elsenhower. President Roosevelt was half-amused, half-an­
noyed by Churchill's pessimistic Interpretation of Russian 
intentions.^
British Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery, serv­
ing under Eisenhower, shared Churchill's opinion. Montgom­
ery was ready to march on Berlin when the SHAEF order to 
stop at the Elbe halted his drive. To Eisenhower, Berlin
had become a mere "geographical location" in which he was 
17disinterested. r The: German capital was now devoid of par- 
■^Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 458.
^Ibld.. p. k$6. 15rbld., p. k6li
*J ^
Forrestal Diaries, pp. 36-37*
^Toland, The Last 100 Days, p. 325#
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tlcular importance, Eisenhower wrote in a message to Gen-
eral George C. Marshall, and in a private conversation
with Lieutenant General George S. Patton, Jr., Eisenhower
asked the laconic question: “Well, who wants it [Berlin]?”
Patton replied: “I think history will answer that question
19for you.” 7 He was right.
However, at this stage of the discussion Elsenhower
won with his well-founded arguments that the Big Three, in
20accepting the EAC draft of September 12, 1 9 had fixed 
the Allied zones of occupation. No matter how far the An­
glo-American forces would advance eastward, they would have
to retreat to the zonal demarkation lines in order to honor 
21the agreement. The Supreme Allied Commander “was prepared
to make an issue of it,” due to his belief in the “military
22 23soundness” of his strategy. The plan was adopted. With
18Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. *K)1.
^Toland, The Last 100 Days, p. 371*
20Supra, p. 32.
21Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 399*
22ibia., p. 403.
23-'Re-evaluating this fateful decision with the advan­
tage of hindsight, both Churchill and U.S. Ambassador Murphy 
came to a similar conclusion. The Prime Minister*s politi­
cal arguments for a drive toward Berlin fell on unfertile 
ground in Washington, since American foreign policy advisers 
were paralyzed and without a leader, as a result of Presi­
dent Roosevelt's rapidly failing strength. Therefore, the 
military leaders had to make the decision. They looked at 
the problem from the point of view of the professional sol­
dier, failing to grasp the political issue at stake. See:
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that the Soviets came an undreamed-of step closer to the 
realization of their goal— the transformation of Germany 
into another Russian satellite.
The Fall of Berlin and the 
Soviet Interpretation of 
Unconditional' Surrender '
The Battle of Berlin was launched by the Russians in 
the middle of April, 19^5. On May 2, the German armed for­
ces, defending the city, surrendered to the Russians. Thus,
the fierce struggle which had been characterized by savage
ohstreet fighting, ended.
With the capture of the German capital, the Soviet 
Union had achieved her primary objective— to be omnipotent 
in the conquered territory. Lenin*s dream of a Communist 
revolution in Germany had never come true. His heirs were 
eager to tackle the task of fashioning her according to his 
will. J Defeated, her cities smoking rubble piles, her 
people numbed by the horrors of war and of conquest, Germany 
seemed to be a ripe fruit ready to be picked and to be put 
into the Soviet basket.
Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. ^55»» and Murphy, Diplo­
mat among Warriors. P. 2297
oh
For the most detailed and most vivid account of the 
Battle of Berlin to date see: Ryan, The Last Battle.
^Stefan Brant, The East German Rising: 17th June 1953 
(London: Thames and Hudson, 1955). P. 14. Hereafter cited 
as Brant, The Bast German Rising.
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Preparations for the Communist take-over had been
elaborate* The Soviet Military Administration (SMA) arrived
with detailed plans of how to rebuild Germany according to
26the Communist pattern. The mighty Red Army was considered
to be one of the most effective Soviet tools; propaganda was
another one. Persuasive slogans such as "Hitlers come and
Hitlers go— the German people lives forever, J. V. Stalin,"
27were plastered all over Russian occupied German territory. ' 
In order to appeal to the German national pride, the posters 
were appropriately printed in black-white-red letters— the 
traditional Prussian colors.
Even more effective than the SMA was a group of Ger­
man Communists who had fled to the U.S.S.R. when Hitler came 
to power. In the Soviet Union, these German emigrants had 
graduated from the toughest schools of Communist subversion. 
Now, a selected group of ten under the guidance of Walter 
Ulbricht^ slipped back into Berlin.-^0 It was their task to 
start organizing a communist administration for the city. 
"Group Ulbricht," as they were labeled, began its task the
26Ibld. 27Ibld., p. 13.
28It>ld.
^Ulbrloht is the infamous leader of Moscow’s puppet 
regime of the Soviet Zone in Germany. To date, he is the 
only remaining Stalinist among the leaders of the Soviet 
satellite states.
30J Wolfgang Leonhard, Die Revolution entl&sst ihre Kin­
der (Koln, Berlin: Kiepenhauer & Witsch, 1955)* P. 332. 
Hereafter cited as Leonhard, Die Revolution entl&sst ihre
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day of the Berlin surrender— on May 2, 19^5 Backed by 
the SMA and Marshal Zhukov’s order which called for the cre­
ation of "anti-fascist” parties,^ Group Ulbricht located
33old Communist comrades who were drafted for the cause.
Thus, adding members, the circle increased and "anti-fas-
3k
cist" cells developed in all of Berlin’s twenty boroughs.
Moscow had issued definite instructions concerning 
the make-up of "anti-fascist" borough administrations. Ul­
bricht ’ s direotive advocated political patterns similar to 
those during the time of the Weimar Republic, This would 
give a democratic appearance to the administrations. ^ How­
ever, the departments of personnel, education, and interior
(police), and the first deputy mayor of every borough were
36to be, in each instance, reliable communists. The scheme 
was simple: It would seem to be democratic, yet all power




3 Beate Ruhm von Oppen (ed.)t Documents on Germany un- 
der Occupation: 19^5-195^ (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford
University Press, 1955)»PP* 37-38. Hereafter cited as Doc­
uments on Germany under Occupation. See also Brant, The 
East German Rising, p. l4.
•^Leonhard, Die Revolution entl^sst ihre Kinder, pp. 
3 5 2 - 3 5 3 ,  i
3W .  P« 355. 35Ibld.. pp. 356-357.
3W . ,  p. 357. 37Ibld.. p. 358.
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The First Soviet-Anglo-Amerlcan 
Encounters In Berlin; An 
Exercise In Biff Three 
Cooperation
The fall of Berlin signified the end of World War II. 
Six days later, on May 8, 1945» the Chiefs of Staff of the
German Armed Forces High Command (OKW) signed the cap!tula-
38tion document, thereby accepting Unconditional Surrender. 
Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, Admiral Hans-Georg Friedeburg, 
and Colonel General Hans Jurgen Stumpff signed for the van­
quished. The United Nations were represented by Marshal of
the Soviet Union Zhukov and Marshal of the Royal Air Force
39Sir Arthur Tedder, Eisenhower’s deputy at SHAEF. 7
A conflict arose among the victors at this first in- 
ter-Allled ceremony. General Charles de Gaulle decided that 
only Elsenhower could properly represent all of the West. 
Since he had not come to Berlin, the French leader instruot-
lxA
ed General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny to sign for France.
This in turn caused U.S. General Carl Spaatz, who was also 
present, to demand the right to sign the document for the
Li
United States. The Russians stalled. Not until after
Walter Anger (ed.), Das Drltte Reich in Dokumenten 
(Frankfurt am Mains Europaisohe Verlagsaristalt, 1957), p.
204.
39Ibld.
Toland., The Last 100 Days, p. 587.
43Tbld., p. 588.
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Marshal Zhukov had cleared the matter with Soviet Deputy
Foreign Commissar Andrei Vishinsky, could the document of
hfZsurrender be signed.
Thus, World War II had come to an end—-at least in 
Europe. With the defeat of Germany, the issue which had 
caused the East-West Alliance had ceased to exist. Although 
the disagreement prior to the signing of the Unconditional 
Surrender of Germany had been only minor, it cast foreboding 
shadows on the future.
Nearly another month passed until the Allies offi­
cially assumed responsibility for the government of Ger­
many.^ A meeting of the Allied Commanders was held in Ber­
lin on June 5» 19^5* to sign the^Declaration Regarding 
[the] Assumption of Supreme Authority by [the] Allied Pow­
ers At the same meeting, them's tat ement on Zones of Occu­
pation in GermanjA^ and the^Statement on Control Machinery 
in German/^ which were omitted from the Yalta communique,^
A2Ibid.
Zi.3
^Redvers Ople et alM  The Search for Peace Settle­
ments (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1951)* 
pp. 69-70. Hereafter cited as Opie et, al., The Search for 
Peace Settlements.
^Baslo American Documents. 19*J*l-^ 9» PP* 506-507*
^Ibld.. p. 512.
Il£
Berlin Documents, pp. 30-31*
^ Supra. p.
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48were released to the press.
The treatment accorded to Western zonal commanders
upon their arrival in Berlin for the June 5 meeting revealed
a typical Soviet trait— unpoliteness. To their annoyance,
the generals had to wait for hours to sign these documents;
49the Soviets failed to explain the delay. y Eventually, 
Eisenhower and Montgomery lost their patience. They noti­
fied Zhukov that they would leave Berlin unless the meeting 
was immediately convened. This action produced a startling 
result: Without further postponement the conference be­
gan,-^ and the documents were signed.
Having completed the ceremony, Elsenhower suggested 
to Zhukov to initiate proceedings leading toward the estab­
lishment of the Control Council. Eisenhower intended to 
leave his deputy, General Lucius D. Clay and his political 
adviser, Ambassador Robert D. Murphy, in Berlin, along with 
a small staff who could prepare the American entry into the
48The zones of occupation were those projected by the 
EAC draft agreement of September 12, 1944. Supra, p. 32.
The control machinery, i.e. Control Council and Kommanda- 
tura, were adopted as planned by the EAC draft agreement of 
November 14, 1944. Supra, p. 35*
^Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (Garden City,
New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1950)» PP* 21-22. 
Hereafter cited as Clay, Decision in Germany, See also 
Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe,p. 436.
-^Montgomery, Viscount Bernard, The Memoirs of Mont­
gomery of Alameln (Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1958")",
P. 338*
-*^Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 22.
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city.-^ Zhukov did not approve of the proposal. Obviously, 
the Soviet Military Governor was not authorized to make a 
decision without specific instructions from Moscow. Sup­
ported by Vishinsky, his political adviser, Zhukov argued 
that American withdrawal to the zonal lines of demarkation 
would be a prerequisite to Western entry into Berlin. 
Eisenhower did not insist on his proposal. He agreed to ar­
ranging the Western entry into Berlin simultaneously to the 
withdrawal from the Soviet zone.
In this first meeting of the Allied military gover­
nors, the Western leaders gained nothing but a foretaste of 
what peacetime cooperation with the Soviets would be like. 
The U.S.S.H. by contrast, boosted her prestige. From now 
on, the SMA could refer to inter-Allied documents as the 
basis for its claim to unlimited power; yet, as long as they 
were the sole occupation force in Berlin, the Soviets could 
openly pursue their policy of communist subversion.
The first American military party leaving for the 
German capital, was a reconnaissance force led by Colonel
^Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, p. 258. See also 
Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 22.
-^Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, p. 258. See also 
Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 23.
About one third of the Soviet zone, large portions 
of Thuringia, Saxony and Mecklenburg, had been overrun by 
Anglo-American forces, before the drive was halted. At this 
point, they still held the territory.
<U,
J Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 23.
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Prank L* Howley,-^ who was to gain fame as the American com­
mandant of Berlin* Starting from the city of Halle at day­
break of June 17» 19^5» the Americans had to cover approxi­
mately 120 miles. Their journey was not over until long af- 
ter dark, and they did not reach their destination* When 
Howley set out, he commanded a column of about 500 officers
and men and 120 vehicles; upon arrival, his force had dwin-
57died to exactly 37 officers, 50 vehicles, and 175 men*
Just six weeks before, the Americans and the Rus­
sians had been fighting a common enemy* Now, the Soviets 
saw fit to harass the mighty Western Ally* They caused the 
failure of Colonel Howleyfs reconnaissance mission* Being 
the first U.S. troops to plunge into territory held by the 
Red Army, they were ready to expect the unexpected. Never­
theless, the Russians held a surprise for them.
Hardly had the Americans crossed into Red Army ter­
ritory, when their convoy was stopped by a road block. ^
This was the beginning of the endless delay. At first, the 
Russians camouflaged their intentions by inviting Howley to 
a victory celebration. When the latter grew restive, anx­
ious to go on with his mission, his Soviet counterpart drop­
ped the friendly mask. Resorting to a favorite Soviet tech­
-^Frank L. Howley, Berlin Command (New York; G. P* 
Putnam*s Sons, 1950)# p. 26* Hereafter cited as Howley, 
Berlin Command*
56Ibld., pp. 27, 34. 57Ibld.. pp. 27, 30-32.
58ibia.. p. 29.
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nique, the Russian alluded to ffformalities" which had to be 
taken care of.-^ jje cited an obscure agreement that sup­
posedly limited an American force to 37 officers, 50 vehi­
cles, and 175 men* Helplessly exposed to Soviet whimsy, 
Howley had no choice but to cut down the number of his force 
accordingly. Then he was given permission to proceed. A 
Russian guided the convoy. But instead of using the four-
lane Autobahn, leading directly to Berlin, the Russian guide
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followed cobble-stoned, secondary country roads.
In Babelsberg, a little town about ten miles south­
west of Berlin, the trip ended. The Americans were brought 
to a compound near Potsdam which was readied for the soon to 
be held last Big Three conference. Kept "virtual prisoners"
in this restricted environment, they were supposed to assist
62in the renovation of the compound. Since reconnaissance 
men were not of much use in this particular enterprise, How­
ley arranged to have them replaced by housekeeping troops.^ 
When the exchange of personnel was completed, Howley left 
for Halle to rejoin his unit. His first encounter with 
the Russians had been unpleasant, although it had been in­
dicative of the Soviet attitude toward the Western Allies.
If it appeared for a while as if the Soviet Union
59Ibid., pp. 29-30. Ibid.. pp. 30-32.
6lIbld., p. 32. 62Ibid., p. 3^.
°3Ibld.. p. 36. 6^Ibld.. p. 1*1.
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was unwilling to embark upon the stormy sea of inter-Allied 
administration, then this interpretation of Soviet thinking 
was wrong. The U.S.S.R. could have chosen to consolidate 
her conquered eastern European empire by clamping down the 
,firon curtain” at the western-most point of Red Army ad­
vance. To honor, at least outwardly, the Big Three agree­
ments meant to leave a loophole in the otherwise perfectly 
tight Communist grip on the overrun territories. Weighing 
the issues at stake, the Kremlin leaders* imperial ambi­
tions won out. The Soviets wanted to add the rich German 
provinces of Saxony and Thuringia to their occupation zone. 
In exchange for them, the Russians were willing to admit the 
West to Berlin.
For the same reason that the Soviets decided in fav­
or of adhering to the agreements, Churchill was against it. 
He argued that to withdraw the American Army to the zonal 
lines of demarkation would be equivalent to handing over to 
the communists an additional 120 mile deep strip on a bOO 
mile long front.^ He wrote to British Foreign Secretary 
Sir Anthony Eden:
Thus the territories under Russian control would in­
clude the Baltic provinces, all of Germany to the 
occupational line, all Czechoslovakia, a large part 
of Austria, the whole of Yougoslavia, Hungary, Ru­
mania, [_an(i] Bulgaria, . . .  It would include all 
the great capitals of Middle Europe, including Ber­
lin, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest, and
Ax
-'Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 502.
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Sofia.
Urging U. S. President Harry S. Truman ( to re-evaluate
68the situation and not to withdraw the American troops, 
Churohill made a last attempt to stem the Soviet tide. The 
new President decided to abide by the Three Power agreements
which had, after all, been negotiated under the auspices of
69
his predecessor and the British Prime Minister. 7
The issue was settled in mid-June 19^5* when Truman
70and Stalin exchanged telegrams on this subject. American 
withdrawal from the Soviet zone of occupation was to be con­
current to the movement of the Western forces to Berlin.
Truman also asked for "provision of free access for 
United States Forces by air, road and rail to Berlin from 
Frankfurt and Bremen.1 ^  Trumanfs telegram to Stalin was . 
the only written evidence of the Western powers* claim to 
the right of free access to and from the city. Stalin did 
not mention the point in his answer, but since the troop re-
66Ibld.. pp. 502-503.
^Truman succeeded to the presidency, when Roosevelt 
died on April 12, 19^5 • See Leahy, I Was There, p.
68
Truman, Year of Decisions, p. 301*
69Ibld.. p. 303.
^U.S.S.R., Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stalin*s Cor- 
respondence with Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt and Truman; 
1941-^5 (New York: E, P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1958)* PP* 
2b5-2b8.
*^1bid., p. 2^5. See also Truman, Year of Decisions, 
P. 303.
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alignment was the result of these Soviet-American cables,
his consent was implied.
To make final arrangements for the troop transfer,
General Clay and his British colleague Lieutenant General
Sir Ronald Weeks flew to Berlin for a conference with Mar- 
72shal Zhukov.( It was agreed to begin the transfer on July 
1, which would permit the Americans to enter the German cap­
ital on Independence Day.^ Verbal agreement was reached on 
free Western access to Berlin. One railroad line, one major 
highway (Autobahn), and two air corridors were allocated to 
the Western Allies.^
On July 4, 19^5» Colonel Howley, as deputy of the 
first commandant of the U.S. sector, Major General Floyd 
Parks, was ready to take over the American sector of Berlin. 
Friction developed with the Soviets. In an attempt to delay 
action, Zhukov sent the following note to General Parks:
In view of the fact that Berlin is to be ruled by an 
Allied Kommandatura and that Kommandatura is not yet 
set up, your sector will not be turned over to you 
until the Kommandatura is set up.'-5
Parks and Howley decided to ignore the Soviet breach of the
Truman-Stalin agreement and to go ahead and to take over
72' Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 24.
73Ibld.. p. 25.
7**Ibid., p. 26. See also Truman, Year of Decisions,
P. 307.
73Howley, Berlin Command, pp. 47-^8.
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their sector, anyway* The commandant cautioned his deputy.:
MDonft get into too much trouble. After all, the occupation
7 6is Just beginning.11' Moving in at daybreak, Howley and his 
men set up the Office of American Military Government, unit­
ed States (OMGUS).^  The Russians were faced with a fait 
78accompli.'
On July 7* 19^5» the Allied military governors had
another session* At this meeting, the Inter-Allied Military
79Kommandatura was formally established.'' Thereafter* inter- 
Allied accord was temporarily exhausted.
A dispute developed over the problem of supplying 
Berlin with food and coal. The capital had always drawn its 
major food supply from the surrounding farm belt and the 
east German provinces. Therefore, SHAEF had assumed that 
the task of feeding Berlin would be a Soviet responsibility. 
Now, Clay and Weeks were confronted with Zhukov* s categori­
cal refusal to bring in food for the Western sectors. As
far as coal was concerned, the Soviet Marshal demanded that
80the city be supplied by Ruhr coal.
Bound by the clause of the EAC agreement that Con-
^ Ibld., pp. 48-^9. See also Clay, Decision in Ger­
many, p. 31.
?7ibia.. p. 49. 78ibia.. p. 50,
79'^Documents on Germany under Occupation, p. 39.
So
Clay, Decision in Germany, pp. 27-28. See also How- 
Berlin Command, pp. 57-59*
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0*1
trol Council decisions would have to be unanimous, the
military governors had to reach a compromise. They did.
Clay agreed to bringing in the food for the American sector,
Weeks promised coal from the Ruhr, and Zhukov gratiously
consented to furnish “some brown coal and hydroelectric pow-
82er , • , from eastern Germany," Having scored a major
victory, Zhukov adjourned the meeting.®^
The next meeting with the Russians took place on
July 11, 1948, As it turned out, it was the first session
84of the Kommandatura; the commandants signed their first 
order.^ With this document, the Western governments indi­
rectly consented to Soviet action in Berlin. These were the 
most important parts of the order:
Until special notice, all existing regulations and 
ordinances issued by the Commander of the Soviet Ar­
my Garrison and Military Commandant of . . . Berlin 
and by the German administration Bgder Allied con­
trol . . , shall remain in force. 5
Unknowingly, the Western powers had approved Of subversive
elements suoh as Group Ulbricht and the likes.
The first proclamation of the Control Council, is-
81Supra. p. 35.
82Clay, Decision in Germany, pp. 28-29.
^Howley, Berlin Command, p. 59•
8\bld., p. 61.
•^Berlin Documents, p. ^6.
86Ibid. See also Howley, Berlin Command, p. 61.
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sued after the opening session on July 30, 19^5» was less
dramatic.®^ It merely reiterated the points of the State-
88
ment on Control Machinery in Germany of June 5* 19^5*
Four days before the first formal meeting of the 
Control Council, France had finally been admitted to the ex­
tremely exclusive Allied club. The EAC protocol of Septem­
ber 12, 1944, had been amended to include France in the
agreement.^ Already at Yalta, a zone and a sector of occu-
<50pation had been allotted to her;7 with the EAC amendment of 
July 26, 1945, France became a full-fledged member of the 
Control Council and of the Kommandatura. Thus, nearly three 
months after V-E Day, the Four Powers were set jointly to 
administer Germany.
The Potsdam Conference:
July7 16-August 27 19^5
Mounting friction among the Allies had increased ev­
er since the last weeks of the war in Europe. President 
Truman was faced with the tremendous task of familiarizing 
himself not only with his new job as President of the United 
States but also with the problems of international arrange­
ments, inherited from his predecessor. Soon it became evi-
^ Berlln Documents, p. 47 •
8^Supra. p. 59.
^ Berlin Documents, pp. 33-34.
9°supra, p. 46.
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dent that the impending break could only be avoided If the 
Big Three could work out agreements at another top-level 
conference.
To sound out the Allies and to prepare for this me­
eting, Truman appointed Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt*s personal 
adviser, and former American ambassador to the U.S.S.R. Jo­
seph E. Davies, as presidential emissaries to Moscow and
London, respectively.^1 Hopkins and Davies went on their
92missions during the last week of May, 19^5«
The primary purpose of Hopkins* mission to Moscow 
was to Impress upon Stalin the fact that the change in U.S. 
presidents did not entail a revision of American attitude 
toward the Soviet Union. Truman intended.to adhere to Roo­
sevelt *s policies.93 Hopkins was a good choice for talks 
with the Soviet dictator. As the late president*s personal 
friend, Hopkins was able to create a warm atmosphere in his 
conversations with Stalin. Hopkins mentioned Roosevelt*s 
confidence after Yalta “that the United States and the Sovi-
Qk
et Union could work together in peace as they had in war.”  ^
Turning to the sticky problem of Poland, where the Soviet- 
backed Lublin government was rapidly erasing the last rem­
nants of democracy, Stalin and Hopkins expressed differing
917 Truman, Year of Decisions, pp. 110, 258-259.
92Ibld.. pp. 259-260. 93Ibld.. p. 258.
Qll
7 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 888.
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opinions. Hopkins outlined the American principle of the 
four freedoms. To Stalin, these were abstract ideas which 
could not be realized as long as the situation warranted ab­
solute p e a c e . B u t  the Soviet Premier agreed to a Big 
Three Conference to settle the East-West problems. He in­
sisted upon the area of Berlin as a meeting place for the 
proposed conference. July 15» 19^5# was accepted by both 
the Soviet Union and the United States as the target date.
o 6The meeting was to be held in Potsdam, a suburb of Berlin.
The purpose of Davies* mission to London was to 
smooth the ruffled feathers of the British Prime Minister. 
Churchill*s suspicions of Soviet intentions had increased 
over the years. With the end of the war in Europe, he felt 
that the common denominator between the Soviet union on the 
one side and the United States and Great Britain on the oth­
er had vanished. To make the bill come out right, he advo­
cated a radical revision of Western policy toward the 
U.S.S.R. Most important, he thought, was the maintenance 
of the Western armed forces in Europe. Demobilization 
should not set in before differences with the Soviet union
^Ibid., p. 906. See also Truman, Year of Decisions, 
pp. 262-263.
^Leahy, I Was There, p. 382. See also Truman, Year 
of Decisions, p. 263. Potsdam had a special historical and 
symbolic meaning. In a more glorious time of German his­
tory, it had been the residence of-famous Prussian kings, 
such as Frederick the Great.
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had been settled.^ Churchill specifically opposed a West-
98ern retreat to the projected zones of occupation.x
Davies disagreed with Churchill. The American envoy 
insisted that strict adherence to the Yalta and EAC agree­
ments provided the only possible road to cooperation with 
the Soviets and hence a peace settlement for the postwar 
world.^ The Prime Minister retained his pessimistic atti­
tude. Passionately, he argued for his point-of-view; he was 
most disturbed by Russia*s application of police state tac­
tics in the submission of countries under Red Army occupa­
tion.^^ Davies was frustrated with Churchill*s continued 
opposition to America*s expressed wish to get along with the 
Russians. In an effort to convert Churchill to a more len­
ient view of the U.S.S.R., he told him:
I [DaviesJ said that frankly, as I had listened 
to him [ChurchillJ inveigh so violently against the 
threat of Soviet domination and the spread of Commu­
nism in Europe, and disclose such a lack of confi­
dence in the professions of good faith in Soviet 
leadership, I had wondered whether he, the Prime Min­
ister, was now willing to declare to the world that 
he and Britain had made a mistake in not supporting
^Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp.
9^U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 
United States; Diplomatic Papers: We'Conference of Berlin 
(The Potsdam Conference): 19^5. Departmentof State Publica­
tion No. 7OI5, Vol. I (2 Vols.; Washington: United States 
Government Printing Office, i960), p. 67* Hereafter cited 
as Foreign Relations: Potsdam.
^Truman, Year of Decisions, p. 261.
^00Leahy, I Was There, p. 378.
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Hitler, for as I understood him, he was now express­
ing the doctrine which Hitler and Goebbels had been 
proclaiming and reiterating for the past four years 
in an effort to break up allied unity and ’divide 
and conquer,1 Exactly the same conditions which he 
described and the same deductions were drawn from 
them as he now appeared to assert,101
Churchill, aware of the fact that England’s position as a
world power was subordinate to that of the United States,
relented. In spite of maintaining that he pursued a harder
line toward the U.S.S.R., he promised to support the united
States in her effort to seek a solution to the differences
102which beset the Big Three alliance.
The Potsdam Conference, last of the Big Three meet­
ings, took place from July 16 to August 2, 1 9 4 5 Prime
104Minister Churchill had suggested the code name TERMINAL, 
meant to symbolize the successful conclusion of the war in 
Europe, It came to reach a much deeper meaning, for the 
Potsdam Conference represented the end of one era and the 
beginning of another. Most obvious was the change in lead­
Forelgn Relations: Potsdam, p, 73• See also Leahy,
I Was There, pp. 378-379. Not only in the light of postwar 
developments but also In view of Western reaction to the 
outbreak of World War II, Davies* statement was stunning, 
Great Britain, after all, had been the first to declare war 
on Germany, While the Soviets made the Hitler-Stalin pact, 
the United States waited until after Pearl Harbor to get in­
to the war,
102Leahy, I Was There, p. 380.
1Q3Ibld.. p. 39*K
104Truman, Year of Decisions, p. 333• See also Murphy, 
Diplomat among Warriors, p.279V"
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ership. President Truman occupied Roosevelts chair; Clem­
ent R. Attlee replaced Churchill as British Prime Minister 
midway through the conference, following the latter*s defeat 
in the general elections.10-’ TERMINAL also signified the
end of naziism and f&soism and the beginning of a new 
lo 6order. Finally, the Conference symbolized the end of the 
Big Three Ailianoe. Completing the hot war they had fought 
together, they initiated the cold war fighting one an­
o t h e r . C h u r c h i l l  later redubbed the Conference’s code 
names he called It FRUSTRATION.108
The Prime Minister’s disillusionment was understand­
able. No progress was made. In order to come up with some 
results, agreements had to be so much watered down by com­
promise that they became utterly ineffective. Truman left
-’Truman, Year of Decisions, p. 395* See also Leahy,
I Was There, p. 41'/. Although there was no perceptible 
change in British policies at Potsdam, the excitement that 
had characterized the Stalin-Churchill exchanges was mis­
sing. The Soviets were cool and condescending in their 
treatment of Attlee and his party. See Murphy, Diplomat 
among Warriors, pp. 275-276; and Leahy, I Was There, p. 419.
"I o 6
Unfortunately, this new order failed to bring peace 
to the world. Soviet subversive actions were in full swing, 
while the Potsdam Conference was in session. The SMA or­
dered the confiscation of private property and initiated the 
land reform leading to the establishment of the collective 
farm system in the Soviet zone of Germany. Sees Klimov, The 
Terror Machine, p. 125. At the same time, Communist indoc­
trination courses were held weekly, all over the Soviet 
zone. See: Leonhard, Die Revolution entl&sst ihre Kinder,
P. 417.
^^Smith, The Defense of Berlin, p. 90.
*1 A  Q
Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 668.
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Potsdam resolved never again to expose himself to the an-
109noying Soviet taotios at the conference table.
The first controversial subject to be discussed at
Potsdam was Poland. At Yalta, the Western leaders had no
choice but to accept the Soviet-backed Polish Provisional
Government; at Potsdam the Western Allies were confronted
with another Soviet fait accompli--the extension of Poland
to the Oder-Neisse Line.^^ Truman charged the Russians
with violating the Yalta agreement by setting up a separate
Polish zone of occupation. Stalin defended the action by
maintaining that the Poles were only helping the Red Army to
111administer the territory. Although the Soviet dictator
insisted that all Germans had fled the area, the President
and the Prime Minister were concerned with the fate of the
112nine million Germans who had inhabited the land. Since 
an agreement was Impossible, the three heads of government 
reverted to the Yalta decisions "Final delimitation of the 
western frontier of Poland should await the peace settle­
^^Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, p. 279#
James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York and 
London: Harper & Brothers Putlishers, 1$h7 ). P* 79* Here­
after cited as Byrnes, Speaking Frankly. See also Leahy,
I Was There, p. k06.
■^^Truman, Year of Decisions, pp. 367-368.
13~^ Ibld.. p. 369* See also Churohill, Triumph and 
Tragedy, pp. 658-659.
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ment."^^ Indirectly, the Western Allies consented to the 
annexation of the German land east of the Oder-Neisse Line. 
The Potsdam protocol provided for the "orderly and humane" 
transfer of Germans from those territories to the four
H k
Allied zones of occupation.
Following Yalta, the idea to dismember Germany had
been dropped. The plan jointly to administer Germany in
matters affecting the whole country was adopted instead.
Reiterating the Yalta proposal, the Control Council was de-
ll6signated to govern. Thus, the Potsdam protocol was mere­
ly a repetition of Allied principles, a guide for the Con­
trol Council to be used as a basis for their deliberations.
No specific mention was made of the status of Berlin. Obvi­
ously, this had been considered unnecessary. The EAC agree-
117ments were quite specific. '
Opposition to the dismemberment of Germany was wel­
comed by the Kremlin leaders for a number of reasons. For 
one thing, the propaganda value was not to be underestima­
^ ^ Berlin Documents, p. 40. See also Byrnes, Speaking 
Frankly." 'p. 81.
U W . , p. M .
11*5^Herbert Feis, Between War and Peace; The Potsdam Con­
ference (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
I960) , P* 236. Hereafter cited as Feis, The Potsdam Confer­
ence.
116Berlin Documents, p. 38-
Joachim Rottmann, Per Vierm&chte— Status Berlins 
(Bonn, Berlin: Bundesministerlum ftir gesamtdeutsche Fragen, 
1959). P. 16.
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ted. The Soviets knew that the Germans feared dismemberment. 
Mixing truth with lies, Stalin declared in his victory
speech that the Soviet Union had no intention "to dismember
11 8
or to destroy Germany.” A more important reason for
Russian opposition to dismemberment was of economic nature.
Soviet reparation claims and participation in the anticapa-
ted international administration of the Ruhr!s industrial
area had a better chance to be realized if Germany was gov-
110erned as a unit. -
The Soviet Union ran into unexpected strong opposi­
tion when the discussion turned to the question of repara­
tions. Basing their claim for ten billion dollars on the 
Yalta protocol, the Soviet leaders had to be reminded that
this sum had been aocepted as a basis for discussion on- 
120ly. The problem could not be solved. It was referred to
121the Control Council for deliberation.
Probably the most important Potsdam decision was the
122agreement to treat Germany "as a single economic unit."
Since the heads of government could not agree at Potsdam, 
their representatives on the Control Council could hardly be
118Peis, The Potsdam Conference, p. 238.
^■^Meissner, Russland, die Weltm&chte und Deutschland.
P. 70. 1
120Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 39*
121Berlin Documents, p. 39*
122Ibld.. p. 38.
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expected to be more successful. Yet, this provision bound 
the military governors to the often exasperating, always fu­
tile attempt to act in unison— an Impossible task.
Realizing that the Big Three could not reach agree­
ments at Potsdam, they reverted to their favorite method—
postponement. For this purpose, the Council of Foreign Min-
123isters was set up with a permanent seat In London. The
foreign ministers were to continue the negotiations for a
peace settlement. France and China were invited to join.
Together the nations might work out their outstanding dif- 
12Uferences.
The Potsdam Protocol was held in general terms, for
there was no agreement on specific i s s u e s . A  poor guide
for Allied policy, it failed to look toward the future, but
instead was based upon the assumption that Allied unity was
a reality. But this had become a dream of the past by the
12^time the Big Three met at Potsdam. Subsequent events in 
Berlin were an outgrowth of the East-West split. The Big 
Three leaders had not been able to bridge the gap.
^2^Berlln Documents, p. 3^.
124Xbld.. p. 35.
12*5•^Ratchford and Ross, Berlin Reparations Assignment,
p. kk.
J. P. Nettl, The Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy in 
Germany: 19^5-50 (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford Univer­
sity Press, 1951), p. 5*K Hereafter cited as Nettl, The 
Ea st ern Zone•
CHAPTER IV
BERLIN— MICROCOSM OF POSTWAR DEVELOPMENTS.
1945 - 19A9
The Inter-Allled Administration 
of Berlin: 19^5-19^7
World War II had brought Germany to the brink of ob­
livion. Not since the Napoleonic Wars had battles scorched
her soil. Now, the devastation was worse than anything ever
n
experienced before. The degree of destruction in Berlin 
was particularly high, partly as a result of Allied bomb­
ings, and partly due to heavy Soviet artillery shelling dur-
2ing the Battle of Berlin. Troops of the Western Allies on 
their arrival in the German capital were stunned by the ex­
tent of the destruction. To remove the rubble, it was es­
timated, would take sixteen years, using 11 ten trains a day,
Alfred Grosser, The Colossus Again: West Germany 
from Defeat to Rearmament,'trans. Richard Rees [New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1955)» P* 57* Hereafter 
cited as Grosser, The Colossus Again.
2Edgar Mclnnis, Richard Hiscocks, and Robert Spencer, 
The Shaping of Postwar Germany (New York: Frederick A. Prae- 
ger, Publishers, 1960), p. lO3. Hereafter cited as Mclnnis 
et al., The Shaping of Postwar Germany. See also Ratchford 
and Ross, Berlin Reparations Assignment, p. ty.
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of fifty wagons each.”*^ The appearance was misleading.
Life emerged from underneath the smoking ruins. Yet, long 
before the outer destruction scarred, Berlin underwent a 
spiritual rebirth which restored to the Germans an honora­
ble place among the peoples of the world. In the ensuing 
East-West struggle, Berlin came to symbolize man*s eternal
ji,
quest for freedom.
It was only when the Western powers took over their
sectors of occupation, that the Berliners began to reoover
from the shock of the Soviet conquest. At first, they were
fascinated observers of the drama of inter-Allled adminis-
tration.-' Soon, they themselves entered the stage and like
the chorus in a Greek tragedy, added substance to the play
making their appraisal of the principal actors. The Western
6nations assumed the role of the underdog. The Soviets had 
prepared the basis for the division of Germany while they
3
^Mclnnis et al.. The Shaping of Postwar Germany, p.
103.
bInfra, p. 111.
^Wolfgang G. Friedmann, The Allied Military Govern­
ment of Germany (Londons Stevens and Sons Ltd., 19^7), p.
21. Hereafter cited as Friedmann, The Allied Military Gov­
ernment of Germany, 
z
Completing the analogy to a Greek tragedy, Aristot­
le’s definition of a hero is noteworthy. According to the 
philosopher, the hero’s misfortune is brought down upon him 
by himself due to an "error in judgment.” also known as the 




were sole rulers of Berlin, During this time, communica­
tions with the Western powers concerning joint Allied con-
Q
trol were praotioally non-existent. Once the Inter-Allied 
machinery had been set up, it became evident that the sepa­
rately developed plans were so divergent that combined ad-
o
ministration was vitally hampered from the very beginning.
Subsequent developments resulted not so much from the policy
of any one of the Allies toward Germany but were conditioned
10by the inter-Allied character of the occupation.
The quadripartite adventure of inter-Allied adminis­
tration lacked harmony from the very outset. The forms of 
disagreement ranged from verbal battles to physical fights. 
At the top level, the military governors fought verbally; 
the disputes were more pronounced in the Kommandatura; bul­
lets settled many arguments among the soldiers during a per­
iod of adjustment. After the Americans had first taken over 
their sector, they got an alarming number of German calls, 
asking for help. Russian soldiers, not quite realizing that 
the days when Berlin was completely at their mercy were ov­
er, returned frequently to the Western sectors for their fa-
'’supra, pp. 55-57.
Q
Friedmann, The Allied Military Government of Ger­
many. p. 15.
9ibia.
Harold Zink, The united States In Germany; 19^-1955 
(Princeton, New Jersey, Toronto, London, New York: D. Van 
Nostrand Company, Inc., 1957)» P* 103.
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vorite pastime— looting, raping, and killing at will. To 
stop them, Americans, failing to get the message across in 
any other way, occasionally had to make use of their weap­
ons, These incidents raised a furor with the SMA, but the
violence did not cease until the Russians ordered their sol-
11diers to, remain within the Soviet sector of Berlin.
In spite of these disturbances, the first year of 
inter-Allied administration was relatively successful. Ow­
ing to Increasing Western needs of access routes to Berlin, 
the Control Council reached agreement on November 30, 19^5*
to allot another air corridor to the West, thus raising the
12number to three* Previous agreements regarding Pranco-An-
glo-American access rights to and from the capital had fall-
13ed to produce a written guarantee from the Soviets.  ^
Therefore, the Control Council amendment was of tremendous 
importance. It stated specifically: "Plight over these 
routes will be conducted without previous notice being glv-
l/i
en, by aircraft of the nations governing Germany.” The 
Soviets had made their first major mistake. With the air
11Howley, Berlin Command, pp. 66-72.
12Lyman M. Tondel, Jr. (ed.), The Issues in the Ber- 
lln-German Crisis (Dobbs Perry, New York: Oceana Publica­
tions, Inc., 1963), p. 7. Hereafter cited as Tondel, The 
Issues in the Berlin-German Crisis.
^ Supra, pp. 32,66,
Ik
Tondel, Jr* (ed*). The Issues in the Berlin-German 
Crisis, p. 7,
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corridor amendment they provided the West with the means to 
combat communist strangulation attempts*
Berlin represented the first stage in the Soviets' 
political plan to create a central communist government for 
Germany* In establishing city and borough administrations 
before the Western powers arrived, they hoped to gain the 
support of the population,^ This chance was irreparably 
damaged by the behavior of the Red Army soldiers after the 
fall of the city. The German Communist Party (KPD) was as­
sociated in people's minds with the SMA, and all the horrors
16that Russian rule brought to Berlin,
Evaluating the situation, the Soviets realized that
drastic action had to be taken in order to sway events in
their f a v o r T h e  Moscow-trained German communists, in
collaboration with the SMA, decided to eliminate the KPD's
i ftstrongest competitor— the Social Democratic Party (SPD),
The forceful merger of the two labor parties into one, the 
so-called Socialist Unity Party (SED), was to ensure Commu-
^Philip Windsor, City on Leave; A History of Berlin: 
19^5-1962 (Londons Chatto & Wlndus, 19&3)» PP. 50-51* Here­
after cited as Windsor, City on Leave,
16Edward H, Litchfield et al., Governing Postwar Ger­
many (Ithaca, New York: CornelT University Press, 1953)» P* 
15^* Hereafter cited as Litchfield et al., Governing Post­
war Germany.




nlst predominance at the polls. 7 It was a poor camouflage.
Social Democrats recognized that the merger would
mean annihilation. Having secured Kommandatura permission
to hold a referendum, they Inflicted a crushing defeat on
220 1the Communists. In spite of the unanimous Kommandatura 
decision to allow party members to vote on the issue, the 
SMA saw fit to bar voters from the polls in the Soviet sec­
tor. Threats and arrests in East Berlin only helped to 
highlight the result of the referendum In West Berlin: Ov­
er eighty percent of the Social Democrats rejected the amal-
21gamatlon with the Communists. Stubbornly pursuing their 
policy, the Communists held a convention, in April 1946, 
Joining the SPD turncoats and the KPD into a new Communist 
Party— the SED.22
Subsequently, both the SPD splinter group and the 
newly created SED asked for Inter-Allied recognition without 
which they were not permitted to operate. A major struggle 
rocked the Kommandatura. The Soviet commandant, General 
Alexander Kotikov, opposed the recognition of the rump-SPD 
on grounds that the party was now a part of the SED. The
^Litchfield et al.. Governing Postwar Germany, p.
15**.
20Howley, Berlin Command, p. 105.




Western commandants refused to go along with this concept* 
Hopelessly deadlocked, the commandants referred the question 
to the military governors• The Control Council sent it 
straight back to the Kommandatura. In the end, after pro­
longed dispute, the commandants decided to acknowledge both 
23parties. J
A similar procedure was followed when the Kommanda­
tura failed to agree on a date for the first city-wide, free 
elections to be held in postwar Berlin. Ever since March 
19^6, Colonel Howley had pleaded for municipal elections. 
Just as consistently, the proposal had been rejected by Gen­
eral Kotikov. After the question had been referred to the
Control Council for aotion, the idea was adopted by the Sov- 
2/j,
lets. General of the Army Vassily Sokolovsky, Zhukov1s
successor as Soviet military governor, was better Informed
on the political trends of the Kremlin. Apparently, the
Soviets were not yet prepared to completely abandon Western
principles.^ On August 13, 19^6, the Kommandatura approved
2 6a temporary constitution for the City of Berlin. It re­
turned to its citizens the basic democratic right of politi­
cal self-determination. The constitution was to become ef-
^Howley, Berlin Command, pp. 106-110.
2Vbld., pp. 119-121.
^Litchfield et al.. Governing Postwar Germany, p.
157.
26Berlin Documents, pp* ^8-50.
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27fective after the October elections*
The elections were a unique experience. Internal
politics were unimportant, since a more significant issue
28was at stake— communism versus democracy. Only seventeen
months after the defeat of Germany, the vanquished had the
29opportunity to pass Judgment on the victors. • The result 
of the voting would clearly reflect the attitude of the Ber­
liners toward the occupying powers. Both sides were aware 
of the implications.
Having lost prestige in the SPD referendum, the Com­
munists were particularly anxious to score a victory. All 
their endeavors were supported by the SMA. Their vast prop­
aganda machine was set in motion, displaying the full range
from persuasion to intimidation. Pood and electricity were
30used as political meansr the Americans were accused of
27Ibld.. p. U-8.
28Howley, Berlin Command, p. 118.
297Friedmann, The Allied Military Government of Ger­
many, p. 22.
-^The Soviets distributed extra food rations to the 
Soviet sector in an attempt to convey the image of Communist 
generosity as compared to the regular, low rations in the 
Western sectors. Berliners got their first taste of Husslan 
tactics when the Soviet sporadically shut off the electri­
city-fifty percent originated in the Soviet zone— in order 
to blame the Western Allies of inefficiency in supplying 
their sectors with energy. See Howley, Berlin Command, pp. 
122-123.
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31looting their zone;-' and the parties which tended toward
32the West were subdued in the Soviet sector* The Soviets
forgot only one things Too much propaganda made the Germans
suspicious. Their dismal situation was a result of their
belief in the wrong leaders; they would not make the same 
33mistake twice♦ ^
Up to this point, the United States had maintained a 
detached attitude. American leaders had been reluctant to 
get involved in what they considered matters of purely Ger­
man concern. Now, exactly fourteen months after the Ameri­
can entry into Berlin, the time for counter-measures had 
come. On September 19^6, RIAS (Radio in the American 
Sector) began broadcasting from Berlin, providing an alter-
3 II
native to the Soviet-controlled Radio Berlin. Two days
later, Soviet propaganda received another blow. Striking
fear in German hearts, they repeatedly announced the expect-
3*5ed withdrawal of American troops.  ^ The rumor was dispersed
^Ibld., p. 126. Blaming their own crimes on others 
has always been a favorite Soviet technique.
32 ^Litchfield et al., Governing Postwar Germany, p.
157.
-^Grosser, The Colossus Again, p. 70.
34
J Berlin, Press and Information Office, in co-opera­
tion with Statistical Office, Berlin: Figures, Information, 
Charts, prepared by Heinz Moos (Berlin: Press and Informa- 
tion Office, 1963), P. 12. Hereafter oited as Berlins Fig­
ures. Information. Charts.
3*5
•^Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 187. The Soviet-spread 
rumor was based on Roosevelt*s remark at Yalta* There, the
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when U.S. Secratary of State James P. Byrnes responded to 
General Clay’s appeal to invalidate communist propaganda. 
Addressing a German audience at Stuttgart, he ”sounded the 
first constructive note which had come from the Western oc­
cupying powers. ^  Secretary Byrnes boosted German morale, 
assuring them that American armed forces would stay as long 
as the situation demanded it, "probably . . * for a long 
period.
The result of the Berlin municipal elections of Oct­
ober 30, 1946, has made history. Berliners inflicted a de­
vastating defeat upon the Communists. The SED trailed the 
two major democratic parties, the SPD and the CDU (Chris­
tian Democratic Union). Only the relatively minor LDP (Lib­
eral Democratic Party) gained fewer votes than the Commu- 
nlsts.  ^ The utter defeat was caused by their close associa­
tion with the Russians; all SMA measures had been supported
President limited the maintenance of U.S. armed forces in 
Europe to two years after the defeat of Germany. See Stett- 
inius, Roosevelt and the Russians, p. 127.
•^Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 78.
^^Ibid., P* 80. For tiie complete speech see Basic Am­
erican Documents, 1941-49. PP* 522-527.
■^Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 190.
•^Election results: SPD: 1*8.7%, DCU: 22.2^, SED:
19.8^, LDP: 9*3^* See Berlin: Figures. Information. Charts, 
p. 12. See also Howley. Berlin Command, p. 131*. Clay. De­
cision in Germany, p. 139 •» and Leonhard, Die Revolution en- 
tl^sst ihre Kinder, p. 452.
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and defended by the SED.**’0 Encouraging the Germans during 
the election campaign had borne rich fruit for the Ameri­
cans— a vote of confidence. With this development, the 
Western powers came to realize that the future held a re­
alignment in store. Former enemies, the Western Allies and 
Germany, would face the new menace to world peace, the Sovi-
ki
et Union, together.
Soviet policies adjusted rapidly to the changed sit­
uation. Since they had been repudiated by the electorate, 
their dream of eventually gaining control of all of Germany 
by first winning Berlin had dissolved. The idea to consoli­
date the area under their immediate control replaced the 
outdated strategy. Berlin remained a tempting prize, seem­
ingly within Soviet reach.
To postpone and possibly to prevent the start of a 
truly democratic city administration, the SMA exerted its 
power in the inter-Allied Kommandatura. German city offi­
cials were subject to Kommandatura approval. Stalling the 
process of an orderly transfer of power from the Soviet ap­




Leonhard, Die Revolution entl&sst ihre Kinder, p*
^5 2.
1*1Windsor, City on Leave, p. 50.
1*2Howley, Berlin Command, p. 139*
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The new Lord Mayor Dr. Otto Ostrowski (SPD) was not 
elected by the municipal deputies until December 5* 19^6.*^ 
Ostrowski cut a pitiful figure. A weak man* he was unable 
to cope with the situation.^ Intimidated by the NKVD (peo­
ple’s commissariat of internal affairs, that is the Soviet 
secret police), he agreed to support the SED. As a result, 
he was Impeached by the SPD and he resigned in mid-April 
19^7.^
New trouble emerged for the Kommandatura. After the 
NKVD had put a lot of effort into 11 converting11 Ostrowski to 
their side, Kotikov was unwilling to accept his resignation. 
Once again, the commandants deadlocked and had to send the 
problem to the military governors for a solution. The Con­
trol Council accepted Ostrowski's resignation along with
Kotikov’s demand for inter-Allied approval of an elected of-
A6ficial in advance to an election. Democracy had been 
dealt another blow.
The effects of the new directive became Immediately 
apparent. Dr. Ernst Reuter (SPD) was nominated by the muni­
cipal deputies to be the new Lord Mayor of Berlin. In his
A3^Berlins Figures. Information. Charts, p. 12# p. 12.
LL
Ferdinand Friedensburg, Berlins Schlcksal und Aufgabe 
(Berlins P&dagogisoher Verlag Berthold Schulz7 1953)• P« 23* 
Hereafter cited as Friedensburg, Berlin: Schlcksal und Auf- 
gabe.
^Howley, Berlin Command, pp. 1A5-1A6. 
w m d . ,  pp. 146-1^7.
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youth he had been a member of the KPD. Becoming disillu-
Lr7
sloned, he forswore communism and joined the SPD. 1 There­
fore, the Soviets considered him an arch-enemy. Kotlkov 
used his veto, thereby preventing Reuter from assuming of­
fice. Mrs, Louise Sohroeder (SPD) took over as Aoting Lord
USMayor; Dr. Ferdinand Friedensburg became her deputy. Un­
der the circumstances, it was a satisfactory solution. Reu­
ter did not become mayor until after the split of the city.
Struggles in the inter-Allied Kommandatura showed 
the rapid deterioration of the wartime Alliance. The rela­
tionship suffered so sharp a decline within the first two 
postwar years that the world was soon faced with another 
abyss— the prospect of World War III.
Inter-Allied Policies in Germany
Opposing interests of the Four Powers had proven de­
trimental to the exercise of inter-Allied administration of 
Berlin. A similar situation developed on the national lev­
el. However, clashes among the occupying powers were not as 
violent, since they had unlimited authority within their 
zones. The Allied agreements provided for a joint policy in 
matters affecting Germany as a whole, a directive which al-
^ Ibld.. p. 148.
U8
Friedensburg, Berlins Schlcksal und Axifgabe. pp. 23-
2U.
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lowed varied interpretations.^ The Control Council, creat­
ed to enforce the joint policy, was paralyzed most of the 
time, since the Allies were unable to coordinate their aims, 
U.S. polioy in Germany was guided initially by a mem­
orandum issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. JCS/IO67 was 
designed to ensure the enforcement of "programs of repara­
tion and restitution.11^ 0 The controversial document had 
been worked out by an interdepartmental committee, which re­
flected the conflicting views of Secretaries Hull, Stimson, 
and Morgenthau.-^ Rejecting the idea to partition Germany, 
it limited the powers of OMGUS by ordering to carry out a 
punitive program. Apart from the polioy of denazification, 
^demilitarization, decentralization, and non-fraternization,
JCS/IO67 projected a remodeled Morgenthau Plan— the denuding
<2of industry and the maximum pastoral!zation of Germany.
Ug
Berlin, by contrast, was to be administered jointly. 
The path left to the commandants was too narrow to steer a- 
way from a collision course. See Rudolf R. Leglen, The Four 
Power Agreements on Berlin: Alternative Solutions to the 
Status Quo?, trans. Trevor Davies (Berlin: Carl Heymanns 
Verlag, 1961), pp. 13, 15, 27.
^°Ratchford and Ross, Berlin Reparations Assignment, 
pp. ^0-^1.
^Opie et al., The Search of Peace Settlements, p. 7*K
12
J Clay, Decision in Germany, pp. 17-18. President 
Truman dis11ke & ‘the Morgenthau Plan and opposed the Secre­
tary^ mingling in foreign policy. When Morgenthau threat­
ened to resign if he would not be included in the U.S. dele­
gation to Potsdam, Truman Immediately accepted his resigna­
tion. See Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, p. 270. Consid­
ering that JCS/1067 was issued only two weeks after Roose-
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General Clay* as military governor responsible for the pro­
per execution of the directive, was shocked by ,fits failure 
to grasp the realities of the financial and economic condi­
tions which confronted” OMGUS. ^  JCS/1067* he said* “con­
templated [a] Carthaginian peace.
Washington did not react to Clay’s plea for a policy 
revision until July 15* 19^7 Based on Secretary Byrnes’ 
19^6 Stuttgart speech, the new directive, JCS/1779* aimed at 
“the creation of those political, economic and moral condi­
tions in Germany which will contribute most effectively to a
stable and prosperous E u r o p e . T h e  right of the Germans
<7
to “higher standards of living,” was also acknowledged.
The British generally supported U.S. policies. JCS/ 
1067 was one of the few exceptions. They considered the di­
rective too impractical to follow it.^ Going along with 
Churchill's negative attitude toward the Soviet Union* the 
Labor government instructed its representative on the Con­
trol Council, General Sir Brian Robertson, to remain suspi-
velt's death, it is not amazing that the negative implica­
tions of the directive escaped Truman's attention.
•^Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 18.
^Ibld.. p. 19. 55Ibld., p. 237.
Ople et al*. The Search for Peace Settlements, p.233>
57rbia.
^Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, p. 285«
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clous of Soviet intentions, and to oppose their designs.
Although SHAEF had been dissolved on July 13» 19^5*^ Anglo-
American relations remained excellent# Most of the time,
especially when democratic principles were involved, the
British seconded American motions# A Soviet representative
on the Allied Control Commission, Major Gregory Klimov,
characterized the British attitude as follows:
Great Britain had played out her role, and now, with 
a pride born of self-confidence, was surrendering
her place to the younger and stronger as befitted a
gentlemani
France, snubbed at Potsdam by the Big Three who 
failed to invite her to the Conference, stayed aloof# Turn­
ing the rebuff into an asset, the French frequently vetoed 
the Potsdam Protocol#^ The policy, pursued by France was
inspired by the wish to weaken Germany permanently. She had
62no confidence in the democratization of Germany# There­
fore, the French advocated a radical decentralization of all
63political institutions# ^ France was not free from terri­
torial ambitions, since she wished to sever the heavily in­
dustrialized Saar area from Germany as part of her repara-
-^Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 441.
^0Klimov, The Terror Machine, p. 441.
^Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, pp. 286-287.
^2Clay, Decision in Germany. P# 105*
63Ibld.. p. 110.
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6ktions. Often, France's national Interests were a hin­
drance to the execution of Anglo-American plans. The Soviet 
Union benefitted from the disharmony among the Western Al­
lies.^ Major Klimov’s characterization was fitting:
France was the reflection of all the greatness 
to be found In European culture. But only the re­
flection. Her representatives were the successors 
to Bonaparte and Voltaire, the contemporaries of 
Pierre P^tain and Jean-Paul Sartre. Existentialism*
How to keep one's head above the water* °
The aims of the Soviet Union were clear. Her ac­
tion in Berlin and in the Soviet zone gave a direct indica­
tion of her policy. The communists wanted to gain as much 
as possible, politically as well as economically. The de­
sire for reparations, along with an iron will to further 
their alms— if necessary by force— were the gist of Soviet 
policies. They acted accordingly.
Considering the divergent attitudes of the Allies, 
subsequent events seemed to follow a logical pattern. At 
Potsdam, the heads of government had delegated their author­
ity to the military governors, presenting them with the task 
to work out a Joint policy*» The Potsdam Protocol asked the
6kFrance enforced her will. But the Saar area was re­
turned in 1957 after the issue was put to a vote. In the 
referendum, the local inhabitants elected to be rejoined 
with Germany.
^Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, p. 287.
66Klimov, The Terror Machine, p. 1^9*
67Control Council "to perform the impossible*M '
One reason for the inefficiency of the Control Coun­
cil was its very nature; There was nothing under its con­
trol. The military governors who headed the Council remain­
ed first an<| always the representatives of their countries. 
Each was all-powerful in his zone, but they completely 
lacked authority in the others. If the Control Council
reached agreement, there was absolutely no way to check its 
68
enforcement. Everything depended upon good will from all 
parts— a poor insurance in world power politics.
Another reason for the failure of the Control Coun­
cil was embodied in its charter. The requirement for unani­
mous decisions, left that body at the mercy of the 
69U.S.S.R., 7 who made frequent use of the veto power. Thus, 
the Soviets and the French shared the dubious distinction to 
have effectively blocked Anglo-American attempts at creating 
the rudiments for a workable arrangement.
When the Control Council first assumed authority, 
the prospects for success had not yet disappeared. Before 
too long, measures providing for denazification, demilitari-
^Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, p. 283.
68Richard Thllenius, Die Tellung Deutschlands: Elne 
Zeltgesohlchtllche Analyse (Hamburgs Rowohlt Taschenbuch 
Verlag, 1957). P. 133-
^Konrad Adenauer, Memoirs; 19^-^-53. trans. Beate Ruhm 
von Oppen (London: Weidenfeld and N1colson, 1966), p. 69.
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zation* and the punishment of war criminals had been adopt­
ed But these were minor programs. The Allies failed to 
come to terms on the significant issues.
Friction developed over the question of reparations. 
Both the Potsdam Protocol and JCS/106? directed the military
governors to extract an appropriate amount from Germany to
71help restore the European economy. After prolonged dis­
putes In the Control Council, it was decided to pass the 
problem to the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM), which met 
three times in 19^6. The outcome of the conferences corres­
ponded to that of the Control Council— no agreement was 
reached.^ Attempts to adopt measures leading to the cre­
ation of central super-zonal institutions met with the same 
result
Barely a year after V-E Day, the Soviets and the 
Western powers embarked upon their different courses, one 
trying to outsmart the other. In Berlin, the SMA proceeded
70f Clay, Decision in Germany, pp. 10?, 109*
71' HaJo Holborn, American Military Government: Its Or- . 
ganlzatlon and Policies (Washingtons Infantry Journal Press, 
19^7), P. 58.
72' For a detailed account of the CMF meetings see Clay, 
Decision in Germany, pp. 123-131* 140-1^1. Due to the dead­
lock in the negotiations, resulting from the U.S.S.R.'s de­
mands and the West*s refusal to meet them, the Four Powers 
took reparations from their own zones, leaving the amount up 
to the discretion of the individual power. See Feis, The 
Potsdam Conference, pp. 255* 257.
^Clay, Decision in Germany, pp. 123-12^, 131* 14-1#
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74to interfere in local affairs;' at the Paris CFM meeting, 
Secretary of State Byrnes stood godfather to Bizonia which 
was to develop into the Federal Republic of Germany, Indi­
cating American determination to overcome the inter-Allied 
deadlook, he proposed a merger of occupation zones;
The United States will join with any other occupy­
ing government or governments In Germany for the 
treatment of our respective zones as an economic 
unit.75
Resolved to ease the burden for both the United States and 
Germany, Byrnes intended to advance this plan ’’with or with­
out the Soviet Uni on France and the U.S.S.R. were dis­
interested, but Great Britain was favorably disposed toward 
the idea. She anticipated another SHAEF type of arrangement. 
On July 30, 1946, the British officially accepted the pro­
posal. By September 1?, 1946, Anglo-American preparations
78were completed. Bizonia was born.
The CFM meeting held in Moscow during March and 
April 1947• accomplished nothing but to widen the East-West 
gap. Violent Soviet opposition to the bizonal merger re­
vealed the Kremlin*s sinister schemes to thwart Western
^Supra. pp. 83-84.
^Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 195*
76rbid.
^Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, pp. 303-304.
^Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 169*
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plans.79 jn a conversation with U.S. Secretary of State 
George C. Marshall, Stalin remarked that present difficul­
ties were ”only the first skirmishes of reconnaissance for- 
ces on the German question.”
Instead of frightening the West, the Soviet threats 
backfired. Secretary Marshall recognized that to agree to
A
Soviet plans would be equivalent to handing Germany and Eur-
0 * 1
ope over to communist dictatorship. He knew that immedi­
ate actions had to be taken to meet the Soviet danger. To 
acquaint the American public with the changed Busso-Ameri- 
can relationship, the Secretary appeared on radio and re­
ported on the Moscow conference. Urging the adoption of 
measures to counter the communist threat, Marshall conclud­
ed: ”The patient is sinking while the doctors deliber-
82ate.” Secretary Marshall found the perfect remedy for 
the ailing European countries when he envisioned the Euro­
pean Recovery Program (ERP). First mentioning his idea in 
a commencement speech at Harvard in June 19^7*, the Western
^Walter Bedell Smith, My Three Years in Moscow (Phil­
adelphia and New York: J. B. Lippencott Company, 1950), pp. 
211-212. Hereafter cited as Bedell Smith, My Three Years in 
Moscow* See also Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, p. 306*
80Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, p. 307* See also 
Bedell Smith, My Three Years in Moscow, p. 221.
81Bedell Smith, My Three Years in Moscow, p. 221*
82
Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, p. 307*
®^Clay, Decision in Germany, p. l60.
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European states, meeting in Paris from July 12 to September
8422, willingly endorsed the plan. The Soviet Union com-
85manded her Eastern European satellites to reject it.
The Marshall Plan, as the ERP was popularly called, 
offered financial aid to nations that were willing to help 
themselves. Its implementation caused the upheaval of the 
established trend of thinking. The most obvious result was 
the complete reversal of Soviet-Western relations from what 
they had been during the Second World War. Some Washington 
officials feared to be drawn into an armed confliot against 
the U.S.S.R. Asking U.S. Ambassador W. Bedell Smith wheth­
er the Soviets steered toward war, the ambassador answered: 
“Stalin said, we do not want war but the Americans want it 
even less than we do, and that makes our position strong- 
er."87
In November 1947, before the last CFM conference 
took place in London, the West was put to the verbal test. 
Confusing rhetoric with polemics, the Soviets hurled fantas­
tic, trumped-up charges at the Western representatives, 
blaming them specifically with the destruction of quadripar-
84Murphy, Piplomat among Warrlors. p. 308.
®^Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 160.
86For a critical, contemporary analysis of the Mar­
shall Plan see Seymore E. Harris, The European Recovery Pro­
gram (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Presa)?, 
1955.
^Forrestal Diaries, p. 327.
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tite administration. Secretary Marshall replied with a calm
88statement which explained the American point-of-view. He 
repeatedly reiterated that viewpoint at the London meet­
ing.
In Western Europe, the EBP caused a more positive 
change; it opened the way to economio integration. In Janu­
ary 1948, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin suggested
in a speech to Parliament "a union of Western European coun-
qo ? 91tries."7 Germany was to be invited to participate.7 With
the acceptance of Germany (Bizonia) as a full-fledged mem­
ber of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation 
(OEEC) in early 1948, her lot as an outcast neared the end.
It was the purpose of the OEEC to appropriate ERP funds to 
92member states.7 Thus, Western Europe including West Ger­
many looked forward to reconstruction.
The creation of Bizonia proved to be of mutual value 
to all parties involved— American, British, and German. In 
the beginning, economic aspects overshadowed all others. 
Germany*s industrial center, the Ruhr area, was part of the
go
Clay, Decision in Germany, pp. 161-162, 3^8.
897Basic American Documents, p. 571.
^The Brookings Institution, Major Problems of United 
States Foreign Policy; 1948-49. A Study Guide Prepared by 
the International Studies Group (Washington, D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution, 1948), p. 50.
91ibia.
927 Clay, Decision in Germany, pp. 215-217*
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British zone; the U.S. zone was primarily agricultural. 
Supplementing one another, they eased the Brltish-Amerloan 
administrative task and the fiscal burden of their govern­
ments.
Once the United States and Great Britain had recog­
nized the Soviet threat to future world peace, Bizonia^ 
significance increased. The communist onslaught had to be 
halted. If Germany, because of her central location in Eur­
ope should serve as a buffer, then the Germans would have to 
be won over to the Western cause. To continue the punitive 
policy of JCS/1067 would have been detrimental to Allied in­
terests. The new directive, JCS/1779* issued by Washington 
in 19^7* after the abortive Moscow meeting of the Council of 
Foreign Ministers, reflected the changed attitude.
The West Germans benefited from the situation. 
Economically, they got their share of ERP funds, enabling 
them to rise from the debris of the war to new prosperity. 
Politically, they were restored to an honorable place among 
the nations.
To further the Anglo-American objective, German lo­
cal administrations which had been developed in the differ­
ed
ent states under American tutelage, J were promoted to the 
bizonal level* On February 9» 19^8, the Military Governors 
Generals Clay and Robertson established a German Executive
93Ibld., pp. 86-90, 95. 98-99, 101-102.
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Committee and a High C o u r t C o m b i n e d  with a legislative 
branch— the Economic Council which had been constituted in 
May 19^7^— those German administrative agencies represented 
the essence of a democratic government. Supreme authority 
was still vested in the military governors, but the respon­
sibility of. the German officials increased steadily. When 
the time came for German self-government, a new crop of pol­
iticians had been raised. The British-American policy of
96the democratization of Germany paid off well.
The Breakup
While the Western Allies were preoccupied with the 
development of Bizonia and the ERP, the Soviets planned 
their counterattacks. The rejection in the Berlin city 
elections of 19^6» the violent verbal battles in the Komman- 
datura, the paralysis of the Control Council, and the impos­
sibility to reach agreement at the CFM conferences had con­
vinced the Kremlin leaders that communism could not be ex­
tended beyond the present lines of demarkation— at least for 
the time being. Smarting from Western contempt for Soviet
9\bid., pp. 180-181. 95IbicU, p. 168.
06
7 A letter from Lucius D* Clay, General, Retired, U.S. 
Army, New York, N.Y., April 1^, 1967* gave ample evidence of 
the strategy1s success. Evaluating Germany*s development 
since the time under discussion, Clay wrote: lfI think the 
German people have proved their willingness to support a de­
mocratic government, and to accept some responsibility for 
the government they put into power, I am glad to have them 
as friends and allies in the common defense of free coun­
tries. "
10^
plans and unable to check the Britlsh-American Influence in 
West Germany, the Soviets were determined to fight back.
They decided to force the West out of the German capital by 
blockading Berlin. Nearly all aspects seemed to favor the 
Soviet plan^ The most obvious advantage was the cityfs lo­
cation. Surrounded by Russian occupied territory, the West 
hardly stood a chance to escape the trap. The U.S.S.R. was 
sure of viotory.
The Soviets were not guided by the thought of ven­
geance alone. More Important reasons formed the basis of 
their plans. Since the experiment in inter-Allied adminis­
tration had turned out to be a dismal failure, the Soviet 
Union ventured to lose her influence on the satellite coun­
tries. Her recent loss of prestige, she feared, might re-
97suit in an uprising.^' In order to consolidate her empire
undisturbed, the U.S.S.R. intended to get rid of the Western 
98observers. Soviet methods were not condusive to the pro­
motion of her image.
Paving the way for the intended blockade, the Sov­
iets resumed their verbal attack. On February 13* and March
6, 19*f8, the Soviet Union sent identical notes to the United
99States, Great Britain and France, 7 accusing them in both
^Eugene Hinterhoff, D1sengagement (London: Stevens & 
Sons Limited, 1959)* P. 92.
^^Nettl, The Eastern Zone, p. 108.
9977Fot the complete text of the notes see U.S.S.R., The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Soviet Union and the Berlin
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Instances of violating the Potsdam Protocol. The Soviets
objected to the unilateral actions of the Western Allies in
matters of economic and political recovery of the Western
zones of Germany.1^0
On March 20, 1948, Marshal Sokolovsky walked out of
the Control Council without setting the date for the next
meeting. This signified the end of the highest inter-Allied
agenoy.^*** Thus, the only Allied institution responsible
102for Germany as a whole had ceased to exist. Only two
days later, the Soviets suspended all subordinate agencies
103except the Kommandatura. ^
The commandants continued to meet until the Soviet 
staged the next walk-out. Lacking sound reasons, the SMA 
had to turn to imagination to explain the breakup of all ln- 
ter-Allled administrative agencies. On June 16, 1948, the 
Kommandatura met for the last time. For thirteen hours, the 
Western commandants listened to Soviet abuse. Then, U.S. 
Commandant Howley decided to go home leaving his deputy to 
sit in for him. The Soviets considered Howley*s action an
Question (Moscow: 1948), pp. 5-6, 7-17. Hereafter cited as 
U.S.S.R., The Soviet Union and the Berlin Question.
100Ibld.
^■®^Clay, Decision In Germany, pp. 355-357•
102Meissner, Russland. die Weltm&chte und Deutschland.
P* 73.
*^^0pie et al., The Search for Peace Settlements, p.
252.
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10 4intolerable affront. They walked, out.
Only two days later, the Russians nfound themselves
in the unenviable position of the hunter who shoots his gun
in the air and watches the deer run by.t1^ -* The Western
powers announced a ourrency reform for their zones of occu-
T n 6
pation to become effective on June 20, 1948.
Sokolovsky responded with a proclamation to the Ger­
man p e o p l e . D e n u n c l a t l n g  the Western Allies and oharging 
them with violating the Four Power agreements, in particular 
the Potsdam Protocol, the Russians became guilty of the very 
same thing. He violated both the EAC agreements and the 
Yalta decisions when he declared:
Currency issued in the Western zones of occupa­
tion in Germany will not be permitted to circulate 
in the Soviet zone of occupation and in the area of 
Greater Berlin which comes within the Soviet Zone 
of occupation and is economically part of the Sov­
iet Zone.10y
The latter portion of the statement aimed at providing the
104Howley, Berlin Command, pp. 179-181.
105Ibld., p. 184.
Clay, Decision In Germany, p. 362. The Western 
powers did not decide to introduoe a new currency until 
after the breakup of the Control Council. June 1, was the 
target date for Bizonia to start circulating the new money. 
Owing to sudden French interest in trizonal arrangements, 
the measure was postponed until June 20, 1948. Ibid., p. 
212. See also Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, p. 313*




new Soviet policy toward Berlin with an appearance of lega­
lity. Included in a proclamation, it assumed the character
of an order. Legal finesse, however, did not concern the 
Soviets. Tfie proclamation stated with blunt authority:
"These regulations have the force of law."10^
Fortunately, the Western Allies were by now used to 
Soviet tactics. Russian threats had lost their effective­
ness. Both sides were set on their different courses. The
outcome of the crisis could have been expected: The Soviets
decreed a currency reform for the Soviet zone and all Ber­
lin; the Western powers countered by introducing the new
West German currency in the three Western s e c t o r s . B o t h
112orders were issued on June 23# 19^8 •
The Berlin Blockade
On June 2k, 19^8, the Soviets quit talking and 
started to act. A "technical interruption” induced the SMA 
to stop all rail traffic leading to and from the Western sec­
tors of B e r l i n . S i n c e  roads and waterways were already
109Ibld. 110Ibld., pp. 28-29.
IllGreat Britain, Foreign Office, Germany: An Account 
of the Events Leading up to a Reference of the Berlin Que's- 
tlon to the United Nations: 11th October, 1948. Cond. 753^. 
(His Majesty*s Stationary Office, 19^8), p. 18* Hereafter 
cited as Brit. Foreign Office, The Berlin Question.
^ ^ Berlln Documents, pp. 62-63*
113Ibld.. p. 63.
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U n ­closed, West Berlin was completely Isolated. The Iron
curtain had clamped down; 2,500,000 people were caught in 
the middle of the East-West struggle. Their fate hung lit­
erally in the air.
OMGUS was prepared for the emergency. As the 
U.S.S.R. gradually tightened her grip around Berlin, the
Allies had stocked up a small supply— enough to last for
3 11*5about a month, distributing minimum rations. J To avoid 
a decrease in stocks, Genral Clay called Air Commander 
Lieutenant General Curtis S. LeMay, ordering the entire C-47 
fleet on the Berlin run. The first planes arrived in the 
blockaded city on the next morning, June 25, 19^8. It 
was the birth of the airlift.
While General Clay as military governor of the U.S. 
zone had to keep the over-all situation in mind, Colonel 
Howley as U.S. commandant of Berlin was more concerned with 
local problems. The most urgent task was to boost the mor­
ale of the frightened population. Berliners were isolated 
from the world, threatened with starvation, and their elec­
tricity had been cut off. Not yet satisfied with the physi-
11^Beginning in March 19^8, the Soviets imposed more 
and more restrictions on traffic to and from Berlin. The 
SMA harassed the Western Allies just as much as the Germans. 
For a chronological enumeration of the process of strangula­
tion see Brit. Foreign Office, The Berlin Question, pp. 15- 
19*
^••^Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 365* 
ll6Ibld.. pp. 365-366.
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cal hardships of the blockade, the Soviets pulled every
trick of psychological warfare they knew. They threatened
to cut off the water too. But more enervating than anything
else was the rumor that the savage Mongolian hordes, who had
sacked the city after the defeat, would return. To add
color to the rumors, Soviet armed forces held maneuvers just
beyond the city limits.
Colonel Howley decided to address the Berliners over
118RIAS. Without informing General Clay beforehand, Howley
assured the Germans of American support. He promised that
the United States would stay in Berlin and that they would
^119face the crisis together. 7 After Howley*s radio announce­
ment, Berliners regained their courage.
Clay’s and Howley*s independent actions were prob­
ably the most amazing aspects of the first day of the block­
ade. Before Washington had recovered from the Soviet blow,
the men on the spot had taken care of the most urgent prob- 
120lems. For once, the right men were in the right place at 
the right time,
■^^Howley, Berlin Command, pp. 198-199* 202-203.
118Letter from Frank L. Howley, Brigadier General, Re­
tired, U.S. Army, New York, N.Y., April 10, 19&7- Howley 
explained: flIt wasn*t a time for conferences— it was a time
for action and quick.”
^^Howley, Berlin Command, p. 200.
120Who influenced who cannot properly be established. 
Howley wrote: "Our Lciay’s and Howley*sj actions in Berlin
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Both Clay and Howley had shown courage and fore­
sight. Their measures were endorsed by President Truman. 
Clay*s idea of the airlift was revolutionary. Obviously, it 
took a layman to envision it. The experts, especially Air 
Force Chief of Staff, General Hoyt. S. Vandenberg, saw many 
obstacles and opposed the plan. Vandenberg argued that U.S. 
bases around the world would have to be denuded, weakening
the U.S.A. in too many spots, on order to ensure the success
^ 121 of the project.
Truman preferred the airlift to the more dangerous
% 122task of sending an armed convoy to Berlin. In the begin­
ning, the airlift was considered a short, temporary means 
that would allow the Allies to overcome the diplomatic dead­
lock without having to negotiate under pressure. With this
thought in mind, Truman ordered every available plane on the 
°\ 121Berlin run. J By June 28, 19^8, President Truman had adop­
ted Howley*s attitudes The United States would not give in 
to Soviet pressure.
certainly determined Washlngton*s policy.” Frank L. Howley, 
personal letter, April 10, 1967.
121Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. II: Years of Trial 
and Hope (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc.,
1956), p. 125. Hereafter cited as Truman, Years of Trial 
and Hope. See also Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, p. 318.
122Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, pp. 125-126.
^2^Ibid., p. 123. See also Forrestal Diaries, p. **52. 
12 Forrestal Diaries, p* ^55*
Ill
Thie two World Wars had put the United States In the 
unoontested position as leader of the Western world. Tru­
man’s decision to stay in Berlin and to face the Soviet 
threat acknowledged this fact. With it, the United States 
departed decisively from the old idea of isolationism. Re­
sponsibility and risks that go with leadership were accepted
** 125 instead. D
’‘Operation Vittles,** as the airlift was nicknamed, 
reflected the attitude of the Western nations toward one 
another. The British were true partners of the U.S., making 
every effort to serve the common purpose. The French, by 
contrast, could not yet warm up to an enterprise which 
strained national resources for the sake of Germans. France
did not participate in the airlift, but she stayed in Berlin
!'2"
along with the others.3-
Instead of driving a wedge between the Western Al­
lies and the Germans— the hesitant rapport, exemplified in 
extending ERP help to Germany, was still quite new— the So­
viet blockade of Berlin helped to raise the German cause be­
yond the purely pragmatio approach to a symbolic level. The 
quest for freedom and the rights of man were threatened.
The challenge was met. Ernst Reuter, the Berlin mayor who
^^^Charles B. Robson (ed.), Berlins Pivot of German 
Destiny (Chapel Hill: The University of North' Carolina 
Press, i960), p. 48.
126Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, p. 318*
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had been prevented from assuming offloe by a Soviet veto In
the Kommandatura, stated In a Berlin mass demonstrations
We appeal to the people throughout the world! In 
America, in Great Britain, in France and Italy—  
wherever you may be— gaze on this city and realize 
that Berlin and its people cannot be abandoned*
They must not be abandoned! 7^ ' v
The appeal was heard and Berlin was saved*
During the eleven months long blockade, the airlift
128
brought 1,73&»781 tons of goods into the city. It took
212,621 flights to accomplish the task.^*^ So life went on
in the beleaguered city. Export goods produced during this
^130time bore the proud stamp "Made in Blockaded Berlin." ^
In spite of the tremendous hardship and sacrifi-
/<r*131ces, ^ the SMA preferred to deny the very existence of the 
blockade, and to ridicule the airlift as a Western propagan-
127rBerlin, Press and Information Office, in co-opera­
tion with Horst Korber, Reference; Berlin, English version 
prepared by Michael S* Berenson (Berlin; Press and Informa­
tion Office of Berlin, 1963)* P. 12.
128Erich Schmidt Verlag (ed*), Hauptstadt Berlin: Son- 
derheft der Zahlenbilder aus Politic, WirtschaftV Kultur 
(Berlins Erich Schmidt VerlagV 1963). P. 8. Hereafter cited 
as Schmidt Verlag (ed*), Hauptstadt Berlin* The total was 
divided as follows: coal: 62.8%, food: 27*9#, and industrial
goods: 9.3#*
129Ibid.
^°Lowell Bennett, Berlin Bastion: The Epic of Post- 
War Berlin (Frankfurt am Main: Fred Rudl Publisher, 1951),
P. 155.
^■•^Seventy-four American and British fliers lost their 
life. See Schmidt Verlag (ed.), Hauptstadt Berlin, p. 8.
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da device. According to Sokolovsky, the Soviets never in­
tended to force the Western powers out of Berlin, nor did
132they want to starve the Berliners into submission. J For­
tunately, the Soviets were unable to do either one or the 
other. The only thing they achieved was the deepening of 
the East-West split. Berlin truly became a divided city.
As a result of communist pressure in East Berlin, the duly 
elected deputies transferred their offices and their meet­
ing place to West Berlin. The SED retaliated by proclaiming
*^133
the set-up of a separate East Berlin city government.
The Settlement
The airlift had been initially started to prevent 
the Western powers from losing ground before the crisis 
could be settled on the diplomatic level. It continued un­
til the Soviets realized that their blockade was a failure 
and that the Western Allies could not be forced out of Ber­
lin. While world attention centered on the dramatic events 
in Berlin, the wheels of diplomacy were set in motion.
On July 6, 19^8, the United States and Great Britain 
delivered Identical notes to the Soviet Union. The notes 
protested the Soviet blockade and reasserted Western rights
^■^Gunther Albrecht (ed.), Berlin in Bliokpunkt der 
Welt: Elne Dolmmentat1on uber RecHt"und~ “uhrecht urn und in 
Berlin 19W  bis 1959 BQrlln: VEB Deut?cher^Zentralver-
iag,' 1959), P. «!•
133•^Berlins Figures. Information, Charts, p. 13*
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134In Berlin as Based on the Four Power agreements. ^ The So­
viet note of July 14, 1948, rejected the Western interpreta­
tion of the agreements. Instead, the U.S.S.R. charged that 
the Western Allies had lost their rights to be in Berlin as 
a result of their preparations for the establishment of a 
West German Government. The currency reform was mentioned 
as a particular e x a m p l e . 1 ^  ^
Although the two views were diametrically opposed,
Truman, hoping that a compromise might be reached, instruct-
136ed Ambassador Smith to confer with Stalin. The Moscow 
discussions seemed promising. Stalin dropped his demand 
that the Western powers should delay any further prepara­
tions for a West German government. He insisted, however, 
that the East German currency should be introduced in all 
Berlin. With the understanding that the currency would be 
controlled by the Four Powers, Ambassador Smith and British 
and French colleagues, agreed to the proposal. Attempts to 
work out a formal statement failed. Molotov asserted that
^^U.S., Department of State, Germany: 1947-1949; The 
Story in Documents, Department of State Publication No. 3556 
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 
205-206. Hereafter cited as Documents on Germany: 1947- 
1949* See also Bedell Smith, My Three Years in Moscow, p. 
237.
^^U.S.S.R., The Soviet Union and the Berlin Question, 
pp. 42-46. See also Bedell Smith, My Three Years in Moscow, 
p. 238., and Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, p. 123.
^-^Bedell Smith, My Three Years in Moscow, p. 238.
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the Western Allies were In Berlin not by legal rights but by 
Soviet sufferenoe only* There was no meeting of the
■X 4/117minds. -/f After a month of negotiations, it was decided to 
refer the currency question to the military governors in 
Berlin. They were directed to work out an arrangement that 
would make the Eastern currency the only legal tender in 
Berlin.
The first Control Council meeting since the Russian 
walk-out was an exercise in frustration. Refusing to even 
consider Four Power control of the East German currency, 
Sokolovsky added new Soviet demands— the complete control 
of the Berlin trade and restrictions on air traffic. Ob­
viously, the Soviets were so sure of the effectiveness of 
the blockade that they saw no reason to come to terms with 
the Western Allies, After seven meetings of the Control
Council, the talks were abondoned. The military governors
138 ^were hopelessly deadlocked. ^
In October 1948, the problem was put before the
1*1,0 %?\
United Nations* Security Council. v The Soviet Union de-
•^^Ibid., pp. 243-247, 249-250* See also Truman, Years 
of Trial and Hope, pp. 126-127.
■^^U.S., Department of State, The Berlin Crisis: Report 
on the Moscow Discussions, Department of State Publication 
No. 3298 (Washingtoni U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948), 
p. 40.
■^Clay, Decision in Germany, pp. 370-371*
^°Brit. Foreign Office, The Berlin Question, p. 84.
116
Ikl
nied the competence of the Security Council. She re-
142 2,c/fused to participate in the United Nations deliberations.
Throughout the winter of 1948-1949» the U.N. continued to
discuss the problem, but was unable to settle the dis- 
1 hr*$°
pute. ^ This was an impossible task as long as any one of 
the principal parties was unwilling to come to terms.
Finally, after eleven months, the Soviets recognized 
the futility of the blockade. Throughout the winter they 
had hoped that the airlift would break down under inclement 
weather conditions. When, contrary to the experts* estima­
tions, the constant drone of the planes— heartbeat of Ber­
lin-remained steady, the Soviet dream turned into a night­
mare. They gained nothing, but they lost more prestige than 
they could afford. They gave up. In May 1949» the Four 
Powers came to an agreement. Effective May 12, 1949, the
blockade was lifted, and relations among the Four Powers
144 51were restored to the status quo ante.
It seemed on the surface as if the year-long strug­
gle had been useless for either side. In reality it caused 
changes of world importance. The Berlin blockade terminated
141U.S.S.B., The Soviet Union and the Berlin Question.
p. 84.
142Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, p. 129.
143-'John Foster Dulles, War or Peace (New Yorkj The Mac­
millan Company, 1950)» P* 58.
144
Documents on Germany: 1947-1949. p# 274.
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the war-time Alliance. The airlift was the beginning of a 
new world realignment. The Western Allies recognized the 
need to accept Germany as an equal partner in their midst.
To initiate the process, the administration of the Western
gones was returned to German rule in the form of the Occupa-
1UZP ^
tion Statute of May 1^, 19^9. Pull sovereignty was not
yet given to the Germans, since the Allies reserved the
l/j-73
right to resume authority at any given time. ' On May 23* 
1949, the Baflc Law of the Federal Republic of Germany was 
enaoted, providing her with a constitution. West Berlin 
was made a state of the Federal Republic. Countering the 
Western move, the Soviets proclaimed the establishment of 
the so-called German Democratic Republic on October 7,
1 2lq
1949. y East Berlin was made the capital of the "German 
Democratic Republic.M Thus, the East-West split was com­
plete. Germany and Berlin gave physical evidence of the end 
of the World War II alliance— a divided city in a divided 
country. The cold war had started.
^ ^ Berlln; Figures. Information. Charts, p. 1*K 
1 k6Complete sovereignty was restored to Germany on May 
5* 1955t simultaneous to German entry into NATO.
IA7
'Frederick W. Pick, Peacemaking in Perspective (Ox­
ford: Pen-in-Hand Publ. Co. Ltd., 1950), p. 175*
1 |iQ
Documents on Germany: 19^7-19*f9. pp. 283-305* 
‘^ Berlin: Figures. Information. Charts, p. l*f.
CONCLUSION
After ten years of upheaval, the world returned, in 
19^5, to a system of balance of power. Although much of 
the war had been fought on European soil, and major crises 
would rock the continent in the future, Europe*s role as a 
result of the war, was not to be as decisive as before.
The centers of powers were shifted to the United States and 
the Soviet Union. Henceforth, world policies would large­
ly be directed from Washington and Moscow. This trend had 
begun during the war; but while the two had been Allies in 
World War II, they were antagonists in the cold war which 
followed and seemingly resulted from the wartime struggle• 
The hastily arranged "war marriage" between the 
Western Allies and the Soviet Union, drawn together for the 
purpose of defeating a common enemy, lasted for the dura­
tion of the war only. The "divorce proceedings" were Initi­
ated immediately after the capitulation of Germany, and the 
nearer the world came to the final end of the war, the fur­
ther the Soviet-Anglo-Amerlcan Alliance drifted apart. 
Conflicting aims regarding postwar polloies oaused the 
split. Considering that the principles of democracy and 
dictatorship are diametrically opposed, this development
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was not surprising. As long as a united military effort 
was essential to assure the defeat of Germany, the 
U.S.S.R.'s political make-up was conveniently overlooked 
by the Western Allies, and she was welcomed as a slightly 
'•radical11 state within the fold of the nations opposed to 
Hitler and his allies.
The Soviet union's different intentions first be­
came apparent to the Western leaders as a result of the 
Russian treatment of the Polish problem. Some Western 
leaders, (Churchill), quickly seemed to sense the differ­
ence in views; others, (including Roosevelt and his closest 
advisers), were slower to accept the situation as changed. 
The fact that the U.S.S.R. had, during the war, joined the 
Western Allies sentiments anticipating a peaceful, demo­
cratically organized, world— by endorsing the Atlantic 
Charter, and by signing the Teheran Declaration of the 
Three Powers and the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe 
— gave the appearance of trustworthiness to the Soviets. 
Unfortunately, Big Three unity as presented to the world in 
these declarations was more of a mirage than a reality. 
Mistaken for reality by a war-weary world, anxious for 
peace and with feverish dreams of a future ideal society, 
it tended to block the more objective appraisals which 
might have been made.
The anxiously awaited day of final peace, which it
120
was hoped would herald the beginning of a new utopian age, 
Instead was marked by a growing awareness that the Soviet 
Union*s plan was the forceful incorporation of all eastern 
Europe into Moscow*s realm of influence.
In the first short half-decade after the war, the 
conflicts that developed between the former Allies in Ger­
many led to a sharp revision of Western policies. While 
the admission of Prance to the nearly exclusive Anglo-Amer­
ican alliance probably did more to hinder than help in the 
achievement of Western aims, it did no permanent damage.
It may have, in fact, hurried the process of Western Euro­
pean integration, and thus may have been a blessing, since 
it forced France and Germany to "bury the old hatchet" and 
help to recognize the benefits to be gained by genuine co­
operation. Soviet intentions, by contrast, created the 
stumbling block to joint inter-Allied administration of 
Germany. As a result, the United States, Great Britain, 
and Prance, guided by realistic as well as idealistic con­
cepts, reluctantly accepted the fact that the future could 
not be jeopardized any longer, and decided to take separate 
actions. Therefore, Bizonia was created, JCS/1067 was re­
vised, preparations for a German administration were made, 
and, ultimately, Germany was included among the Western 
European nations that were to benefit from Marshall Plan 
aid.
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Berlin, finally, was destined to play a special 
role. Events in Western Europe might have developed along 
similar lines, even if the historic capital of modern Ger­
many had never come under joint inter-Allied administra­
tion. As it was, the direct East-West confrontation in the 
German capital helped to speed the exposure of the Soviet 
Union1s true aims and her methods of achieving them. The 
Soviet threat to the freedom of Berlin, especially during 
the 19^8/49 blockade, resulted in the development of a 
wave of sympathy that encompassed the whole of the free 
world. Not only the German people but people throughout 
the free world became emotionally involved. To "hate11 the 
Germans became an attitude of the past. Conversely, the 
Western response to the blockade— the airlift— demonstrated 
to the German people that Western devotion to the ideas of 
freedom and democracy went beyond idle talk. The Atlantic* 
Charter and the Declaration on Liberated Europe had ap­
peared to some as ,fmere words ;,f now it was demonstrated 
that the West would support such sentiments by action.
Thus, the foundations of the German-Western alliance of the 
years after 1950 were forged during the blookade, when 
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